[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.4.0] Protect buffers against INT_MAX datalen overflows.
teor at torproject.org
teor at torproject.org
Fri Aug 9 21:29:58 UTC 2019
commit 74b2bc43fbe61e3a04fe3f5cc9f817be307e13e1
Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias at stoeckmann.org>
Date: Tue Apr 9 11:59:20 2019 -0400
Protect buffers against INT_MAX datalen overflows.
Many buffer functions have a hard limit of INT_MAX for datalen, but
this limitation is not enforced in all functions:
- buf_move_all may exceed that limit with too many chunks
- buf_move_to_buf exceeds that limit with invalid buf_flushlen argument
- buf_new_with_data may exceed that limit (unit tests only)
This patch adds some annotations in some buf_pos_t functions to
guarantee that no out of boundary access could occur even if another
function lacks safe guards against datalen overflows.
[This is a backport of the submitted patch to 0.2.9, where the
buf_move_to_buf and buf_new_with_data functions did not exist.]
---
src/or/buffers.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c
index 89382d1d8..394ba0ccb 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.c
+++ b/src/or/buffers.c
@@ -394,6 +394,10 @@ buf_free(buf_t *buf)
{
if (!buf)
return;
+ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX || buf_in->datalen >= INT_MAX))
+ return;
+ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX - buf_in->datalen))
+ return;
buf_clear(buf);
buf->magic = 0xdeadbeef;
@@ -1034,6 +1038,7 @@ buf_find_pos_of_char(char ch, buf_pos_t *out)
static inline int
buf_pos_inc(buf_pos_t *pos)
{
+ tor_assert(pos->pos < INT_MAX - 1);
++pos->pos;
if (pos->pos == (off_t)pos->chunk->datalen) {
if (!pos->chunk->next)
@@ -1925,6 +1930,7 @@ buf_find_offset_of_char(buf_t *buf, char ch)
{
chunk_t *chunk;
off_t offset = 0;
+ tor_assert(buf->datalen < INT_MAX);
for (chunk = buf->head; chunk; chunk = chunk->next) {
char *cp = memchr(chunk->data, ch, chunk->datalen);
if (cp)
@@ -2044,6 +2050,7 @@ assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf)
for (ch = buf->head; ch; ch = ch->next) {
total += ch->datalen;
tor_assert(ch->datalen <= ch->memlen);
+ tor_assert(ch->datalen < INT_MAX);
tor_assert(ch->data >= &ch->mem[0]);
tor_assert(ch->data <= &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen);
if (ch->data == &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen) {
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