[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.3.5] Protect buffers against INT_MAX datalen overflows.
teor at torproject.org
teor at torproject.org
Fri Aug 9 21:29:01 UTC 2019
commit 5a6ab3e7dbf601ae3cc006855f7f4e6c834cbeb2
Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias at stoeckmann.org>
Date: Sun Mar 31 17:32:41 2019 +0200
Protect buffers against INT_MAX datalen overflows.
Many buffer functions have a hard limit of INT_MAX for datalen, but
this limitation is not enforced in all functions:
- buf_move_all may exceed that limit with too many chunks
- buf_move_to_buf exceeds that limit with invalid buf_flushlen argument
- buf_new_with_data may exceed that limit (unit tests only)
This patch adds some annotations in some buf_pos_t functions to
guarantee that no out of boundary access could occur even if another
function lacks safe guards against datalen overflows.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias at stoeckmann.org>
---
src/common/buffers.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/buffers.c b/src/common/buffers.c
index a01add9be..3951877c5 100644
--- a/src/common/buffers.c
+++ b/src/common/buffers.c
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ buf_t *
buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz)
{
/* Validate arguments */
- if (!cp || sz <= 0) {
+ if (!cp || sz <= 0 || sz >= INT_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ buf_move_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen)
char b[4096];
size_t cp, len;
- if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX))
+ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX || *buf_flushlen >= INT_MAX))
return -1;
if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX - *buf_flushlen))
return -1;
@@ -850,6 +850,10 @@ buf_move_all(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in)
tor_assert(buf_out);
if (!buf_in)
return;
+ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX || buf_in->datalen >= INT_MAX))
+ return;
+ if (BUG(buf_out->datalen >= INT_MAX - buf_in->datalen))
+ return;
if (buf_out->head == NULL) {
buf_out->head = buf_in->head;
@@ -917,6 +921,7 @@ buf_find_pos_of_char(char ch, buf_pos_t *out)
static inline int
buf_pos_inc(buf_pos_t *pos)
{
+ tor_assert(pos->pos < INT_MAX - 1);
++pos->pos;
if (pos->pos == (off_t)pos->chunk->datalen) {
if (!pos->chunk->next)
@@ -997,6 +1002,7 @@ buf_find_offset_of_char(buf_t *buf, char ch)
{
chunk_t *chunk;
off_t offset = 0;
+ tor_assert(buf->datalen < INT_MAX);
for (chunk = buf->head; chunk; chunk = chunk->next) {
char *cp = memchr(chunk->data, ch, chunk->datalen);
if (cp)
@@ -1125,6 +1131,7 @@ buf_assert_ok(buf_t *buf)
for (ch = buf->head; ch; ch = ch->next) {
total += ch->datalen;
tor_assert(ch->datalen <= ch->memlen);
+ tor_assert(ch->datalen < INT_MAX);
tor_assert(ch->data >= &ch->mem[0]);
tor_assert(ch->data <= &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen);
if (ch->data == &ch->mem[0]+ch->memlen) {
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