[tor-commits] [tor/master] dos: Detect circuit creation denial of service
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Jan 30 23:18:27 UTC 2018
commit 97abb3543b858afd27ed857903814175c1dfbf12
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:40 2018 -0500
dos: Detect circuit creation denial of service
Add a function that notifies the DoS subsystem that a new CREATE cell has
arrived. The statistics are updated accordingly and the IP address can also be
marked as malicious if it is above threshold.
At this commit, no defense is applied, just detection with a circuit creation
token bucket system.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
---
src/or/command.c | 6 ++
src/or/dos.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/or/dos.h | 6 ++
3 files changed, 191 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c
index 5866c386e..d2df55a4b 100644
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
#include "config.h"
#include "control.h"
#include "cpuworker.h"
+#include "dos.h"
#include "hibernate.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "onion.h"
@@ -247,6 +248,11 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan)
(unsigned)cell->circ_id,
U64_PRINTF_ARG(chan->global_identifier), chan);
+ /* First thing we do, even though the cell might be invalid, is inform the
+ * DoS mitigation subsystem layer of this event. Validation is done by this
+ * function. */
+ dos_cc_new_create_cell(chan);
+
/* We check for the conditions that would make us drop the cell before
* we check for the conditions that would make us send a DESTROY back,
* since those conditions would make a DESTROY nonsensical. */
diff --git a/src/or/dos.c b/src/or/dos.c
index d1a2c6a28..b83ea6029 100644
--- a/src/or/dos.c
+++ b/src/or/dos.c
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ static uint32_t dos_cc_circuit_burst;
static dos_cc_defense_type_t dos_cc_defense_type;
static int32_t dos_cc_defense_time_period;
+/* Keep some stats for the heartbeat so we can report out. */
+static uint32_t cc_num_marked_addrs;
+
/*
* Concurrent connection denial of service mitigation.
*
@@ -209,6 +212,117 @@ cc_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns)
}
}
+/** Return the number of circuits we allow per second under the current
+ * configuration. */
+STATIC uint32_t
+get_circuit_rate_per_second(void)
+{
+ int64_t circ_rate;
+
+ /* We take the burst divided by the rate which is in tenths of a second so
+ * convert to get a circuit rate per second. */
+ circ_rate = dos_cc_circuit_rate_tenths / 10;
+ if (circ_rate < 0) {
+ /* Safety check, never allow it to go below 0 else the bucket will always
+ * be empty resulting in every address to be detected. */
+ circ_rate = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Clamp it down to a 32 bit value because a rate of 2^32 circuits per
+ * second is just too much in any circumstances. */
+ if (circ_rate > UINT32_MAX) {
+ circ_rate = UINT32_MAX;
+ }
+ return (uint32_t) circ_rate;
+}
+
+/* Given the circuit creation client statistics object, refill the circuit
+ * bucket if needed. This also works if the bucket was never filled in the
+ * first place. The addr is only used for logging purposes. */
+STATIC void
+cc_stats_refill_bucket(cc_client_stats_t *stats, const tor_addr_t *addr)
+{
+ uint32_t new_circuit_bucket_count, circuit_rate = 0, num_token;
+ time_t now, elapsed_time_last_refill;
+
+ tor_assert(stats);
+ tor_assert(addr);
+
+ now = approx_time();
+
+ /* We've never filled the bucket so fill it with the maximum being the burst
+ * and we are done. */
+ if (stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts == 0) {
+ num_token = dos_cc_circuit_burst;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point, we know we might need to add token to the bucket. We'll
+ * first compute the circuit rate that is how many circuit are we allowed to
+ * do per second. */
+ circuit_rate = get_circuit_rate_per_second();
+
+ /* How many seconds have elapsed between now and the last refill? */
+ elapsed_time_last_refill = now - stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts;
+
+ /* If the elapsed time is below 0 it means our clock jumped backward so in
+ * that case, lets be safe and fill it up to the maximum. Not filling it
+ * could trigger a detection for a valid client. Also, if the clock jumped
+ * negative but we didn't notice until the elapsed time became positive
+ * again, then we potentially spent many seconds not refilling the bucket
+ * when we should have been refilling it. But the fact that we didn't notice
+ * until now means that no circuit creation requests came in during that
+ * time, so the client doesn't end up punished that much from this hopefully
+ * rare situation.*/
+ if (elapsed_time_last_refill < 0) {
+ /* Dividing the burst by the circuit rate gives us the time span that will
+ * give us the maximum allowed value of token. */
+ elapsed_time_last_refill = (dos_cc_circuit_burst / circuit_rate);
+ }
+
+ /* Compute how many circuits we are allowed in that time frame which we'll
+ * add to the bucket. This can be big but it is cap to a maximum after. */
+ num_token = elapsed_time_last_refill * circuit_rate;
+
+ end:
+ /* We cap the bucket to the burst value else this could grow to infinity
+ * over time. */
+ new_circuit_bucket_count = MIN(stats->circuit_bucket + num_token,
+ dos_cc_circuit_burst);
+ log_debug(LD_DOS, "DoS address %s has its circuit bucket value: %" PRIu32
+ ". Filling it to %" PRIu32 ". Circuit rate is %" PRIu32,
+ fmt_addr(addr), stats->circuit_bucket, new_circuit_bucket_count,
+ circuit_rate);
+
+ stats->circuit_bucket = new_circuit_bucket_count;
+ stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts = now;
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Return true iff the circuit bucket is down to 0 and the number of
+ * concurrent connections is greater or equal the minimum threshold set the
+ * consensus parameter. */
+static int
+cc_has_exhausted_circuits(const dos_client_stats_t *stats)
+{
+ tor_assert(stats);
+ return stats->cc_stats.circuit_bucket == 0 &&
+ stats->concurrent_count >= dos_cc_min_concurrent_conn;
+}
+
+/* Mark client address by setting a timestamp in the stats object which tells
+ * us until when it is marked as positively detected. */
+static void
+cc_mark_client(cc_client_stats_t *stats)
+{
+ tor_assert(stats);
+ /* We add a random offset of a maximum of half the defense time so it is
+ * less predictable. */
+ stats->marked_until_ts =
+ approx_time() + dos_cc_defense_time_period +
+ crypto_rand_int_range(1, dos_cc_defense_time_period / 2);
+}
+
/* Concurrent connection private API. */
/* Free everything for the connection DoS mitigation subsystem. */
@@ -242,6 +356,71 @@ dos_is_enabled(void)
/* Circuit creation public API. */
+/* Called when a CREATE cell is received from the given channel. */
+void
+dos_cc_new_create_cell(channel_t *chan)
+{
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ clientmap_entry_t *entry;
+
+ tor_assert(chan);
+
+ /* Skip everything if not enabled. */
+ if (!dos_cc_enabled) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Must be a client connection else we ignore. */
+ if (!channel_is_client(chan)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Without an IP address, nothing can work. */
+ if (!channel_get_addr_if_possible(chan, &addr)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* We are only interested in client connection from the geoip cache. */
+ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&addr, NULL, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
+ if (entry == NULL) {
+ /* We can have a connection creating circuits but not tracked by the geoip
+ * cache. Once this DoS subsystem is enabled, we can end up here with no
+ * entry for the channel. */
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* General comment. Even though the client can already be marked as
+ * malicious, we continue to track statistics. If it keeps going above
+ * threshold while marked, the defense period time will grow longer. There
+ * is really no point at unmarking a client that keeps DoSing us. */
+
+ /* First of all, we'll try to refill the circuit bucket opportunistically
+ * before we assess. */
+ cc_stats_refill_bucket(&entry->dos_stats.cc_stats, &addr);
+
+ /* Take a token out of the circuit bucket if we are above 0 so we don't
+ * underflow the bucket. */
+ if (entry->dos_stats.cc_stats.circuit_bucket > 0) {
+ entry->dos_stats.cc_stats.circuit_bucket--;
+ }
+
+ /* This is the detection. Assess at every CREATE cell if the client should
+ * get marked as malicious. This should be kept as fast as possible. */
+ if (cc_has_exhausted_circuits(&entry->dos_stats)) {
+ /* If this is the first time we mark this entry, log it a info level.
+ * Under heavy DDoS, logging each time we mark would results in lots and
+ * lots of logs. */
+ if (entry->dos_stats.cc_stats.marked_until_ts == 0) {
+ log_debug(LD_DOS, "Detected circuit creation DoS by address: %s",
+ fmt_addr(&addr));
+ cc_num_marked_addrs++;
+ }
+ cc_mark_client(&entry->dos_stats.cc_stats);
+ }
+
+ end:
+ return;
+}
+
/* Concurrent connection detection public API. */
/* General API */
diff --git a/src/or/dos.h b/src/or/dos.h
index 3cc10d3f9..bb8d7d1a7 100644
--- a/src/or/dos.h
+++ b/src/or/dos.h
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ typedef enum dos_cc_defense_type_t {
DOS_CC_DEFENSE_MAX = 2,
} dos_cc_defense_type_t;
+void dos_cc_new_create_cell(channel_t *channel);
+
/*
* Concurrent connection DoS mitigation interface.
*/
@@ -112,6 +114,10 @@ STATIC uint32_t get_param_cc_circuit_burst(const networkstatus_t *ns);
STATIC uint32_t get_param_cc_min_concurrent_connection(
const networkstatus_t *ns);
+STATIC uint32_t get_circuit_rate_per_second(void);
+STATIC void cc_stats_refill_bucket(cc_client_stats_t *stats,
+ const tor_addr_t *addr);
+
MOCK_DECL(STATIC unsigned int, get_param_cc_enabled,
(const networkstatus_t *ns));
MOCK_DECL(STATIC unsigned int, get_param_conn_enabled,
More information about the tor-commits
mailing list