[tor-commits] [tor/master] Remove some now-spurious blocks and indentation.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Jan 24 14:01:34 UTC 2017
commit 3efe8bb8ac6c1b62cc488e72b890b699f2fe7081
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Wed Jan 18 15:45:02 2017 -0500
Remove some now-spurious blocks and indentation.
---
src/or/entrynodes.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c
index 22cab26..e99aa00 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c
@@ -2944,22 +2944,20 @@ num_bridges_usable(void)
{
int n_options = 0;
- if (1) {
- /* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */
- tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
- guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info();
- tor_assert(gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE);
+ /* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */
+ tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
+ guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info();
+ tor_assert(gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE);
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
- if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
- continue;
- if (tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity))
- continue;
- const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity);
- if (node && node->ri)
- ++n_options;
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
- }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
+ if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
+ continue;
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity))
+ continue;
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity);
+ if (node && node->ri)
+ ++n_options;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
return n_options;
}
@@ -3106,27 +3104,26 @@ getinfo_helper_format_single_entry_guard(const entry_guard_t *e)
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
- if (1) {
- /* modern case. This is going to be a bit tricky, since the status
- * codes above weren't really intended for prop271 guards.
- *
- * XXXX use a more appropriate format for exporting this information
- */
- if (e->confirmed_idx < 0) {
- status = "never-connected";
- } else if (! e->currently_listed) {
- when = e->unlisted_since_date;
- status = "unusable";
- } else if (! e->is_filtered_guard) {
- status = "unusable";
- } else if (e->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) {
- when = e->failing_since;
- status = "down";
- } else {
- status = "up";
- }
+ /* This is going to be a bit tricky, since the status
+ * codes weren't really intended for prop271 guards.
+ *
+ * XXXX use a more appropriate format for exporting this information
+ */
+ if (e->confirmed_idx < 0) {
+ status = "never-connected";
+ } else if (! e->currently_listed) {
+ when = e->unlisted_since_date;
+ status = "unusable";
+ } else if (! e->is_filtered_guard) {
+ status = "unusable";
+ } else if (e->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) {
+ when = e->failing_since;
+ status = "down";
+ } else {
+ status = "up";
}
+
node = entry_guard_find_node(e);
if (node) {
node_get_verbose_nickname(node, nbuf);
@@ -3247,26 +3244,24 @@ const node_t *
guards_choose_guard(cpath_build_state_t *state,
circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out)
{
- if (1) {
- const node_t *r = NULL;
- const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL;
- entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
- // XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here.
- if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) {
- /* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be
- * chosen as our guard for this circuit. */
- rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t));
- memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN);
- }
- if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
- GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
- rst,
- &r,
- guard_state_out) < 0) {
- tor_assert(r == NULL);
- }
- return r;
+ const node_t *r = NULL;
+ const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL;
+ entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
+ // XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here.
+ if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) {
+ /* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be
+ * chosen as our guard for this circuit. */
+ rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t));
+ memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+ if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
+ GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
+ rst,
+ &r,
+ guard_state_out) < 0) {
+ tor_assert(r == NULL);
}
+ return r;
}
/** Helper: pick a directory guard, with whatever algorithm is used. */
@@ -3274,25 +3269,23 @@ const node_t *
guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info,
circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out)
{
- if (1) {
- /* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here,
- * apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info
- * downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into
- * choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you
- * find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha,
- * when we realized that every Tor on the network would support
- * microdescriptors. -NM */
- (void) info;
- const node_t *r = NULL;
- if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
- GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD,
- NULL,
- &r,
- guard_state_out) < 0) {
- tor_assert(r == NULL);
- }
- return r;
- }
+ /* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here,
+ * apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info
+ * downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into
+ * choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you
+ * find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha,
+ * when we realized that every Tor on the network would support
+ * microdescriptors. -NM */
+ (void) info;
+ const node_t *r = NULL;
+ if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
+ GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD,
+ NULL,
+ &r,
+ guard_state_out) < 0) {
+ tor_assert(r == NULL);
+ }
+ return r;
}
/**
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