[tor-commits] [tor/master] Prevention: never die from extend_info_from_node() failure.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Fri Feb 3 15:36:16 UTC 2017
commit 19e25d5cabd23f28044ccbddc01e5cacbde2cfcb
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Fri Feb 3 10:14:25 2017 -0500
Prevention: never die from extend_info_from_node() failure.
Bug 21242 occurred because we asserted that extend_info_from_node()
had succeeded...even though we already had the code to handle such a
failure. We fixed that in 93b39c51629ed0ded2bf807cb6.
But there were four other cases in our code where we called
extend_info_from_node() and either tor_assert()ed that it returned
non-NULL, or [in one case] silently assumed that it returned
non-NULL. That's not such a great idea. This patch makes those
cases check for a bug of this kind instead.
Fixes bug 21372; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha when
extend_info_from_node() was introduced.
---
changes/bug21372 | 4 ++++
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 5 +++--
src/or/control.c | 7 ++-----
src/or/rendservice.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug21372 b/changes/bug21372
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..178ae3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug21372
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (client):
+ - Always recover from failures in extend_info_from_node(),
+ in an attempt to prevent any recurrence of bug 21242.
+ Fixes bug 21372; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 88445f9..8a57d83 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -2110,7 +2110,8 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
return -1;
}
exit_ei = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
- tor_assert(exit_ei);
+ if (BUG(exit_ei == NULL))
+ return -1;
}
state->chosen_exit = exit_ei;
return 0;
@@ -2376,7 +2377,7 @@ onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, circ->cpath, cur_len);
if (r) {
info = extend_info_from_node(r, 0);
- tor_assert(info);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(info);
}
}
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index 2c71ea5..b0a6876 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -3377,7 +3377,8 @@ handle_control_extendcircuit(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, const node_t *, node,
{
extend_info_t *info = extend_info_from_node(node, first_node);
- if (first_node && !info) {
+ if (!info) {
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(first_node);
log_warn(LD_CONTROL,
"controller tried to connect to a node that doesn't have any "
"addresses that are allowed by the firewall configuration; "
@@ -3385,10 +3386,6 @@ handle_control_extendcircuit(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
connection_write_str_to_buf("551 Couldn't start circuit\r\n", conn);
goto done;
- } else {
- /* True, since node_has_descriptor(node) == true and we are extending
- * to the node's primary address */
- tor_assert(info);
}
circuit_append_new_exit(circ, info);
extend_info_free(info);
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 4c5372c..1d6fc0f 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -4162,6 +4162,9 @@ rend_consider_services_intro_points(void)
* even if we are a single onion service and intend to connect to it
* directly ourselves. */
intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
+ if (BUG(intro->extend_info == NULL)) {
+ break;
+ }
intro->intro_key = crypto_pk_new();
const int fail = crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key);
tor_assert(!fail);
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