[tor-commits] [tor/master] Refactor and comment new_route_len()
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Mon Apr 3 16:01:46 UTC 2017
commit ceedcfe9f249746e92d5a4fe9f0589b6691b4d84
Author: Taylor Yu <catalyst at torproject.org>
Date: Tue Mar 28 17:35:11 2017 -0400
Refactor and comment new_route_len()
Add a new helper function route_len_for_purpose(), which explicitly
lists all of the known circuit purposes for a circuit with a chosen
exit node (unlike previously, where the default route length for a
chosen exit was DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN + 1 except for two purposes). Add a
non-fatal assertion for unhandled purposes that conservatively returns
DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN + 1.
Add copious comments documenting which circuits need an extra hop and
why.
Thanks to nickm and dgoulet for providing background information.
---
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 88 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 5277e10..f8b3609 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1545,8 +1545,93 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
return 0;
}
-/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>: three + the
- * number of endpoints that would give something away about our destination.
+/** Helper for new_route_len(). Choose a circuit length for purpose
+ * <b>purpose</b>: DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN (+ 1 if someone else chose the
+ * exit). If someone else chose the exit, they could be colluding
+ * with the exit, so add a randomly selected node to preserve
+ * anonymity.
+ *
+ * Here, "exit node" sometimes means an OR acting as an internal
+ * endpoint, rather than as a relay to an external endpoint. This
+ * means there need to be at least DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN routers between
+ * us and the internal endpoint to preserve the same anonymity
+ * properties that we would get when connecting to an external
+ * endpoint. These internal endpoints can include:
+ *
+ * - Connections to a directory of hidden services
+ * (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
+ *
+ * - A client connecting to an introduction point, which the hidden
+ * service picked (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING, via
+ * circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() which rewrites it from
+ * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
+ *
+ * - A hidden service connecting to a rendezvous point, which the
+ * client picked (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, via
+ * rend_service_receive_introduction() and
+ * rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous)
+ *
+ * There are currently two situations where we picked the exit node
+ * ourselves, making DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN a safe circuit length:
+ *
+ * - We are a hidden service connecting to an introduction point
+ * (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO, via
+ * rend_service_launch_establish_intro())
+ *
+ * - We are a router testing its own reachabiity
+ * (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, via consider_testing_reachability())
+ *
+ * onion_pick_cpath_exit() bypasses us (by not calling
+ * new_route_len()) in the one-hop tunnel case, so we don't need to
+ * handle that.
+ */
+static int
+route_len_for_purpose(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
+{
+ int routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
+ int known_purpose = 0;
+
+ if (!exit_ei)
+ return routelen;
+
+ switch (purpose) {
+ /* These two purposes connect to a router that we chose, so
+ * DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN is safe. */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ /* hidden service connecting to introduction point */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
+ /* router reachability testing */
+ known_purpose = 1;
+ break;
+
+ /* These three purposes connect to a router that someone else
+ * might have chosen, so add an extra hop to protect anonymity. */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ /* connecting to hidden service directory */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
+ /* client connecting to introduction point */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ /* hidden service connecting to rendezvous point */
+ known_purpose = 1;
+ routelen++;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* Got a purpose not listed above along with a chosen exit.
+ * Increase the circuit length by one anyway for safety. */
+ routelen++;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (BUG(exit_ei && !known_purpose)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unhandled purpose %d with a chosen exit; "
+ "assuming routelen %d.", purpose, routelen);
+ }
+ return routelen;
+}
+
+/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> and check
+ * if enough routers are available.
*
* If the routerlist <b>nodes</b> doesn't have enough routers
* to handle the desired path length, return -1.
@@ -1559,11 +1644,7 @@ new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, smartlist_t *nodes)
tor_assert(nodes);
- routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
- if (exit_ei &&
- purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
- purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
- routelen++;
+ routelen = route_len_for_purpose(purpose, exit_ei);
num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_nodes(nodes);
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