[tor-commits] [tor/master] Refactor ...compute_authenticate_cell_body() to return a var_cell_t.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Thu Nov 3 13:18:59 UTC 2016
commit 4ef42e7c529a95b69d3e830e115e5d0453d38dfb
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue May 19 13:10:01 2015 -0400
Refactor ...compute_authenticate_cell_body() to return a var_cell_t.
This means we don't need to precompute the length.
Helps simplify the implementation of 19156.
---
src/or/channeltls.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/or/connection_or.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
src/or/connection_or.h | 3 +--
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c
index 8009c0b..9e92aad 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.c
@@ -2112,9 +2112,11 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
STATIC void
channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
{
- uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN+256];
+ var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL;
const uint8_t *auth;
int authlen;
+ const int authtype = 1; /* XXXX extend this */
+ int bodylen;
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(chan);
@@ -2127,6 +2129,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \
chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \
connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \
+ var_cell_free(expected_cell); \
return; \
} while (0)
@@ -2158,7 +2161,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (4 + len > cell->payload_len)
ERR("Authenticator was truncated");
- if (type != AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
+ if (type != authtype)
ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized");
auth += 4;
@@ -2168,14 +2171,26 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
ERR("Authenticator was too short");
- ssize_t bodylen =
- connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
- chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected),
- AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET, NULL, NULL, 1);
- if (bodylen < 0 || bodylen != V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN)
+ expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+ chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1);
+ if (! expected_cell)
ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
- if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, bodylen))
+ if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET ||
+ authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) {
+ bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN;
+ } else {
+ bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN; /* XXXX DOCDOC */
+ }
+ if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) {
+ ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected.");
+ }
+
+ /* Length of random part. */
+ if (bodylen < 24)
+ ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible");
+
+ if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24))
ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
{
@@ -2246,6 +2261,8 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
chan->conn->base_.port);
}
+ var_cell_free(expected_cell);
+
#undef ERR
}
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index fed933b..ed91595 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -2292,8 +2292,8 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
}
/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
- * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Write it to the
- * <b>outlen</b>-byte buffer at <b>out</b>.
+ * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Return it
+ * in a var_cell_t.
*
* If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
* V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
@@ -2309,9 +2309,8 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
*
* Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
*/
-int
+var_cell_t *
connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
- uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
const int authtype,
crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
@@ -2319,7 +2318,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
{
auth1_t *auth = NULL;
auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
- int result;
+ var_cell_t *result = NULL;
int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
const char *authtype_str = NULL;
@@ -2444,7 +2443,22 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
* checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
+ ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
+ if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+ maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+ } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
+ maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
+ }
+
+ const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
+ result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen);
+ uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+ const size_t outlen = maxlen;
ssize_t len;
+
+ result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
+ set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
+
if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
goto err;
@@ -2457,7 +2471,8 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data.");
goto err;
}
- result = (int) (tmp->end_of_fixed_part - out);
+ result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload);
+
auth1_free(tmp);
if (len2 != len) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
@@ -2488,7 +2503,6 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
}
auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
-
}
len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
@@ -2496,12 +2510,15 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
goto err;
}
+ tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len);
+ result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+ set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len));
- result = (int) len;
goto done;
err:
- result = -1;
+ var_cell_free(result);
+ result = NULL;
done:
auth1_free(auth);
auth_ctx_free(ctx);
@@ -2515,8 +2532,6 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
{
var_cell_t *cell;
crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
- int authlen;
- size_t cell_maxlen;
/* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
if (!pk) {
@@ -2529,33 +2544,15 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
return -1;
}
- /* XXXX stop precomputing this. */
- cell_maxlen = 4 + /* overhead */
- V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + /* Authentication body */
- crypto_pk_keysize(pk) + /* Max signature length */
- 16 /* add a few extra bytes just in case. */;
-
- cell = var_cell_new(cell_maxlen);
- cell->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
- set_uint16(cell->payload, htons(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET));
- /* skip over length ; we don't know that yet. */
-
- authlen = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
- cell->payload+4,
- cell_maxlen-4,
+ cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET,
pk,
NULL,
0 /* not server */);
- if (authlen < 0) {
+ if (! cell) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
- var_cell_free(cell);
return -1;
}
- tor_assert(authlen + 4 <= cell->payload_len);
- set_uint16(cell->payload+2, htons(authlen));
- cell->payload_len = authlen + 4;
-
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
var_cell_free(cell);
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.h b/src/or/connection_or.h
index 8373ed9..65a8ac1 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.h
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.h
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus);
MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn));
int connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
-int connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
- uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
+var_cell_t *connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
const int authtype,
crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
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