[tor-commits] [tor/master] Extend intro point to a 4th hop on cannibalization
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed Jun 17 13:42:00 UTC 2015
commit a5b5d4bd2ea08c2db84aa53f44111f8492af1f62
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet at ev0ke.net>
Date: Tue Jun 16 10:29:29 2015 -0400
Extend intro point to a 4th hop on cannibalization
Fixes #16260
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet at ev0ke.net>
---
changes/bug16260 | 11 +++++++++++
src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendservice.c | 19 ++++---------------
3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug16260 b/changes/bug16260
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a75cb1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug16260
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+ o Minor bugfix (Hidden service)
+ - When cannibalizing a circuit for an introduction point, always extend
+ to the chosen exit node creating a 4 hop circuit instead of using the
+ current circuit exit node which resulted in changing the original
+ intro point choice. This resulted in the hidden service skipping
+ excluded nodes like for instance reconnecting to an expired intro
+ point.; Fixes #16260; bugfixes on tor-0.1.0.1-rc~460.
+
+ This is particularly important for the introduction point retry
+ behavior (#8239) since cannibalization is allowed, which is desired,
+ so it's important to pin the chosen exit point.
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index 28c70ad..69d0f76 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -1766,12 +1766,12 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
switch (purpose) {
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
/* it's ready right now */
break;
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
/* need to add a new hop */
tor_assert(extend_info);
if (circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info) < 0)
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index c857d4c..89f95d7 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -2765,21 +2765,10 @@ rend_service_launch_establish_intro(rend_service_t *service,
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)));
return -1;
}
-
- if (tor_memneq(intro->extend_info->identity_digest,
- launched->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
- char cann[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1], orig[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
- base16_encode(cann, sizeof(cann),
- launched->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- base16_encode(orig, sizeof(orig),
- intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- log_info(LD_REND, "The intro circuit we just cannibalized ends at $%s, "
- "but we requested an intro circuit to $%s. Updating "
- "our service.", cann, orig);
- extend_info_free(intro->extend_info);
- intro->extend_info = extend_info_dup(launched->build_state->chosen_exit);
- }
+ /* We must have the same exit node even if cannibalized. */
+ tor_assert(tor_memeq(intro->extend_info->identity_digest,
+ launched->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN));
launched->rend_data = rend_data_service_create(service->service_id,
service->pk_digest, NULL,
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