[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug15760_hard_026_v2'
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Jun 2 17:45:52 UTC 2015
commit 0030765e04d8dfe3dfaf8124b01a4d578b7d8ceb
Merge: 3d653df ff835e2
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue Jun 2 13:45:27 2015 -0400
Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/bug15760_hard_026_v2'
Conflicts:
src/common/tortls.c
configure.ac | 18 ++++
src/common/tortls.c | 289 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 198 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/common/tortls.c
index a4b6c48,deeee5f..a1bc9ab
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@@ -741,31 -787,9 +724,9 @@@ static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[]
#undef CIPHER
#undef XCIPHER
- /** Holds a cipher that we want to advertise, and its 2-byte ID. */
- typedef struct cipher_info_t { unsigned id; const char *name; } cipher_info_t;
- /** A list of all the ciphers that clients should advertise, including items
- * that OpenSSL might not know about. */
- static const cipher_info_t CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[] = {
- #define CIPHER(id, name) { id, name },
- #define XCIPHER(id, name) { id, #name },
- #include "ciphers.inc"
- #undef CIPHER
- #undef XCIPHER
- };
-
- /** The length of CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST and CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES. */
- static const int N_CLIENT_CIPHERS = ARRAY_LENGTH(CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST);
- #endif
-
- #ifndef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
- #undef CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST
- #define CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST (TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" \
- SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA)
- #endif
-
/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
void
-tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert)
+tor_x509_cert_free(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
{
if (! cert)
return;
@@@ -1597,6 -1644,10 +1558,10 @@@ tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const S
static int
tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+ #ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
- ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
++ ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
+ #else
SSL_SESSION *session;
if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
@@@ -1701,151 -1759,10 +1668,7 @@@ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls
{
SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
}
-#else
-#define tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tls) STMT_NIL
-#endif
- /** Explain which ciphers we're missing. */
- static void
- log_unsupported_ciphers(smartlist_t *unsupported)
- {
- char *joined;
-
- log_notice(LD_NET, "We weren't able to find support for all of the "
- "TLS ciphersuites that we wanted to advertise. This won't "
- "hurt security, but it might make your Tor (if run as a client) "
- "more easy for censors to block.");
-
- if (SSLeay() < 0x10000000L) {
- log_notice(LD_NET, "To correct this, use a more recent OpenSSL, "
- "built without disabling any secure ciphers or features.");
- } else {
- log_notice(LD_NET, "To correct this, use a version of OpenSSL "
- "built with none of its ciphers disabled.");
- }
-
- joined = smartlist_join_strings(unsupported, ":", 0, NULL);
- log_info(LD_NET, "The unsupported ciphers were: %s", joined);
- tor_free(joined);
- }
-
- static void
- set_ssl_ciphers_to_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *stack)
- {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
-
- int r, i;
- /* #1: ensure that the ssl object has its own list of ciphers. Otherwise we
- * might be about to stomp the SSL_CTX ciphers list. */
- r = SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "HIGH");
- tor_assert(r);
-
- /* #2: Grab ssl_ciphers and clear it. */
- ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
- tor_assert(ciphers);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers);
-
- /* #3: Copy the elements from stack. */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(stack); ++i) {
- SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(stack, i);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, c);
- }
- }
-
- /** Replace the ciphers on <b>ssl</b> with a new list of SSL ciphersuites:
- * specifically, a list designed to mimic a common web browser. We might not
- * be able to do that if OpenSSL doesn't support all the ciphers we want.
- * Some of the ciphers in the list won't actually be implemented by OpenSSL:
- * that's okay so long as the server doesn't select them.
- *
- * [If the server <b>does</b> select a bogus cipher, we won't crash or
- * anything; we'll just fail later when we try to look up the cipher in
- * ssl->cipher_list_by_id.]
- */
- static void
- rectify_client_ciphers(SSL *ssl)
- {
- #ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
- if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK)) {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl);
-
- /* We need to set CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK to an array of the ciphers
- * we want to use/advertise. */
- int i = 0, j = 0;
- smartlist_t *unsupported = smartlist_new();
-
- /* First, create a dummy SSL_CIPHER for every cipher. */
- CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES =
- tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)*N_CLIENT_CIPHERS);
- for (i=0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ++i) {
- CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].valid = 1;
- /* The "3<<24" here signifies that the cipher is supposed to work with
- * SSL3 and TLS1. */
- CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].id = CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id | (3<<24);
- CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name = CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].name;
- }
-
- CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
- tor_assert(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
-
- log_debug(LD_NET, "List was: %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST);
- for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); ++j) {
- SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Cipher %d: %lx %s", j,
- SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));
- }
-
- /* Then copy as many ciphers as we can from the good list, inserting
- * dummies as needed. Let j be an index into list of ciphers we have
- * (ciphers) and let i be an index into the ciphers we want
- * (CLIENT_INFO_CIPHER_LIST). We are building a list of ciphers in
- * CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK.
- */
- for (i = j = 0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ) {
- SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
- if (j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers))
- cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, j);
- if (cipher && ((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) >> 24) & 0xff) != 3) {
- /* Skip over non-v3 ciphers entirely. (This should no longer be
- * needed, thanks to saying !SSLv2 above.) */
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Skipping v%d cipher %s",
- (int)((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher)>>24) & 0xff),
- SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));
- ++j;
- } else if (cipher &&
- (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff) ==
- CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id) {
- /* "cipher" is the cipher we expect. Put it on the list. */
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Found cipher %s", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher));
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, cipher);
- ++j;
- ++i;
- } else if (!strcmp(CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name,
- "SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA")) {
- /* We found bogus cipher 0xfeff, which OpenSSL doesn't support and
- * never has. For this one, we need a dummy. */
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Inserting fake %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, &CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i]);
- ++i;
- } else {
- /* OpenSSL doesn't have this one. */
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Completely omitting unsupported cipher %s",
- CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].name);
- smartlist_add(unsupported, (char*) CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].name);
- ++i;
- }
- }
-
- if (smartlist_len(unsupported))
- log_unsupported_ciphers(unsupported);
-
- smartlist_free(unsupported);
- }
-
- set_ssl_ciphers_to_list(ssl, CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
-
- #else
- (void)ciphers;
- #endif
- }
-
/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
* determine whether it is functioning as a server.
*/
@@@ -2773,16 -2751,49 +2634,49 @@@ SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION
* the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
* connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-int
-tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
{
#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
- char buf[128];
+ uint8_t buf[128];
size_t len;
+
tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl->s3);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl->session);
+
+ SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
+ SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ tor_assert(session);
+
+ const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
+
+ tor_assert(server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(master_key_len);
+
+ len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
+ tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
+ }
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, buf+client_random_len, server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
+ }
+ uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
+ tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
+ memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
+
/*
The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
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