[tor-commits] [tor-browser-spec/master] Minor changes.
mikeperry at torproject.org
mikeperry at torproject.org
Mon Apr 28 15:18:47 UTC 2014
commit 5e822bfefbac8621b7fcedfd7c42fdf6af163bb1
Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git at fscked.org>
Date: Wed Sep 28 13:11:46 2011 -0700
Minor changes.
---
docs/design/design.xml | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/design/design.xml b/docs/design/design.xml
index e3870e6..bfffb2b 100644
--- a/docs/design/design.xml
+++ b/docs/design/design.xml
@@ -728,13 +728,14 @@ computer.
and/or what additional work or auditing needs to be done.
</para>
</sect2>
+<!-- XXX: Write me...
<sect2 id="update-safety">
<title>Update Safety</title>
<para>
-<!-- XXX: Design goal vs implementation status -->
XXX: Write me..
</para>
</sect2>
+-->
<sect2 id="identifier-linkability">
<title>Cross-Domain Identifier Unlinkability</title>
<!-- XXX: Mention web-send?? -->
@@ -915,9 +916,9 @@ functionality.
<title>Cross-Domain Fingerprinting Unlinkability</title>
<para>
-In order to properly address the network adversary on a technical level, we
-need a metric to measure linkability of the various browser properties that
-extend beyond any stored origin-related state. <ulink
+In order to properly address the fingerprinting adversary on a technical
+level, we need a metric to measure linkability of the various browser
+properties that extend beyond any stored origin-related state. <ulink
url="https://panopticlick.eff.org/about.php">The Panopticlick Project</ulink>
by the EFF provides us with exactly this metric. The researchers conducted a
survey of volunteers who were asked to visit an experiment page that harvested
@@ -947,12 +948,25 @@ fingerprinting issues, at least not at this stage.
</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem>Plugins
+ <para>
+
+Plugins add to fingerprinting risk via two main vectors: their mere presence in
+window.navigator.plugins, as well as their internal functionality.
+
+ </para>
<para><command>Design Goal:</command>
+All plugins that have not been specifically audited or sandboxed must be
+disabled. Additionally, version information should be obfuscated until the
+plugin object is loaded... <!-- XXX: finish -->
</para>
<para><command>Implementation Status:</command>
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>Fonts
+ <para>
+
+
+ </para>
<para><command>Design Goal:</command>
</para>
<para><command>Implementation Status:</command>
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