[tor-commits] [tor/master] Don't leak a waiting-for-certs consensus when accepting it.

[nickm at torproject.org]

commit cd2b508f4ec22e85104065058722293a951be200
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date:   Wed Apr 17 11:53:52 2013 -0400

    Don't leak a waiting-for-certs consensus when accepting it.
    
    I believe this was introduced in 6bc071f765d2829249db52, which makes
    this a fix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.  But my code archeology has not extended
    to actually testing that theory.
---
 changes/bug8719        |    6 ++++++
 src/or/networkstatus.c |    5 +++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/bug8719 b/changes/bug8719
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c05b79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug8719
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+  o Major bugfixes (memory leak):
+    - Avoid a memory leak where we would leak a consensus body when we find
+      that a consensus which we couldn't previously verify due to missing
+      certificates is now verifiable. Fixes bug 8719; bugfix on
+      0.2.0.10-alpha.
+
diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c
index 2553a74..b78fed3 100644
--- a/src/or/networkstatus.c
+++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c
@@ -1893,11 +1893,12 @@ networkstatus_note_certs_arrived(void)
     if (!waiting->consensus)
       continue;
     if (networkstatus_check_consensus_signature(waiting->consensus, 0)>=0) {
+      char *waiting_body = waiting->body;
       if (!networkstatus_set_current_consensus(
-                                 waiting->body,
+                                 waiting_body,
                                  networkstatus_get_flavor_name(i),
                                  NSSET_WAS_WAITING_FOR_CERTS)) {
-        tor_free(waiting->body);
+        tor_free(waiting_body);
       }
     }
   }