[tor-commits] [tor-design-2012/master] tweak a little more

[nickm at torproject.org]

commit 6937de0311b895b90c9404a6a62758ddd9ca572a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date:   Fri Nov 9 21:52:00 2012 -0500

    tweak a little more
---
 todo                |    9 ++++-----
 tor-design-2012.tex |    4 +++-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/todo b/todo
index 6ddbcb3..66f3207 100644
--- a/todo
+++ b/todo
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ITEMS:
      o Node discovery and the directory protocol
      o Security improvements to hidden services
        o DHT
-       - Improved authorization model for hidden services
+       o Improved authorization model for hidden services
      o Faster first-hop circuit establishment with CREATE_FAST
      o Cell queueing and scheduling.
    * Integrate content from the second blog post [steven]
@@ -34,14 +34,13 @@ ITEMS:
    * Revise related work [steven]
 
    * Revise design goals and assumptions [steven]
-   * Revise tor-design up to "opening and closing streams" [nick] **
+   o Revise tor-design up to "opening and closing streams" [nick]
    * Revise tor-design "opening and closing streams" onward [steven]
-   * Revise hidden services section [nick]
-     . somewhat done? DHT and autho
+   o Revise hidden services section [nick]
 
    * Revise "other design decisions" [nick]
    * Revise "attacks and defenses" [steven]
-   * Replace "early experiences: Tor in the wild" [???? Nick?]
+   * Replace "early experiences: Tor in the wild" [???? Nick? Can Roger?]
 
    * Revise "open questions in low-latency anonymity" and "future
      directions" [steven]
diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex
index e09a95d..4e02485 100644
--- a/tor-design-2012.tex
+++ b/tor-design-2012.tex
@@ -1279,7 +1279,9 @@ by publishing the hidden service descriptor (containing
 introduction point's addresses) to the ORs whose identity keys
 are closest to a hash of the location-hidden service's identity
 key, the current date, and a replica number. Optionally, the
-hidden service descriptor can be encrypted under a key shared
+portion of the
+hidden service descriptor describing the introduction points
+can be encrypted under a key shared
 with authorized users of the hidden service. Therefore not only
 can unauthorized users not connect to the hidden service or its
 introduction points (the descriptor contains an authentication