[tor-commits] r25433: {projects} put anchors on the sections, since i keep wanting to referen (projects/articles)
Roger Dingledine
arma at torproject.org
Wed Feb 15 19:47:51 UTC 2012
Author: arma
Date: 2012-02-15 19:47:51 +0000 (Wed, 15 Feb 2012)
New Revision: 25433
Modified:
projects/articles/circumvention-features.html
Log:
put anchors on the sections, since i keep wanting to reference them
individually
Modified: projects/articles/circumvention-features.html
===================================================================
--- projects/articles/circumvention-features.html 2012-02-15 13:20:28 UTC (rev 25432)
+++ projects/articles/circumvention-features.html 2012-02-15 19:47:51 UTC (rev 25433)
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
consider important.
</p>
+<a id="1"></a>
<h3>1. Has a diverse set of users</h3>
<p>
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@
users it will attract.
</p>
+<a id="2"></a>
<h3>2. Works in your country</h3>
<p>
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@
useful tools are not an option for you.
</p>
+<a id="3"></a>
<h3>3. Has a sustainable network and software development strategy</h3>
<p>
@@ -144,6 +147,7 @@
the future.
</p>
+<a id="4"></a>
<h3>4. Has an open design</h3>
<p>
@@ -195,6 +199,7 @@
forward too slowly.
</p>
+<a id="5"></a>
<h3>5. Has a decentralized architecture</h3>
<p>
@@ -247,6 +252,7 @@
to end up more public than we'd like.
</p>
+<a id="6"></a>
<h3>6. Keeps you safe from websites too</h3>
<p>
@@ -292,6 +298,7 @@
through any active content, meaning it's trivial to unmask their users.
</p>
+<a id="7"></a>
<h3>7. Doesn't promise to magically encrypt the entire Internet</h3>
<p>
@@ -332,6 +339,7 @@
Anybody who promises "100% security" is selling something.
</p>
+<a id="8"></a>
<h3>8. Provides consistently good latency and throughput</h3>
<p>
@@ -366,6 +374,7 @@
transfer.
</p>
+<a id="9"></a>
<h3>9. Makes it easy to get the software and updates</h3>
<p>
@@ -410,6 +419,7 @@
thousands of users seamlessly moved from the public relays to bridges.
</p>
+<a id="10"></a>
<h3>10. Doesn't promote itself as a circumvention tool</h3>
<p>
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