[tor-commits] [tor/master] Clean up some XXX comments.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed Dec 26 04:34:55 UTC 2012
commit aa16d59ee7abdf7c3309c267052ae265e141e1b3
Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git at fscked.org>
Date: Sun Dec 9 23:50:05 2012 -0800
Clean up some XXX comments.
---
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 4 ----
src/or/circuituse.c | 1 +
src/or/relay.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index a724006..f903bbf 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1434,10 +1434,6 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
if (circ->timestamp_dirty) {
/* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful
* streams could be bias */
- // XXX: May open up attacks if the adversary can force connections
- // on unresponsive hosts to use new circs. Vidalia displayes a "Retrying"
- // state.. Can we use that? Does optimistic data change this?
-
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Circuit %d closed without successful use for reason %d. "
"Circuit purpose %d currently %s.",
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index d3b4801..cb44bba 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
* building). */
// XXX: Cannibalized now use RELAY_EARLY, which is visible
// to taggers end-to-end! We really need to probe these instead.
+ // Don't forget to remove this check once that's done!
if (circ->has_opened &&
circ->build_state->desired_path_len > DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN) {
circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index 3ee0c83..6ed4b93 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -697,7 +697,9 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
/* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit,
* it wasn't due to tagging */
// XXX: This relies on recognized+digest being strong enough not
- // to be spoofable.. Is that a valid assumption?
+ // to be spoofable.. Is that a valid assumption?
+ // Or more accurately: is it better than nothing? Can the attack
+ // be done offline?
circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
}
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