[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.2.1] Don't crash when accountingmax is set in non-server Tors
arma at torproject.org
arma at torproject.org
Wed Oct 26 20:34:37 UTC 2011
commit d0a91386e5b85c5a0db3981a294c7a75192f9c3a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Fri Dec 3 13:37:13 2010 -0500
Don't crash when accountingmax is set in non-server Tors
We use a hash of the identity key to seed a prng to tell when an
accounting period should end. But thanks to the bug998 changes,
clients no longer have server-identity keys to use as a long-term seed
in accounting calculations. In any case, their identity keys (as used
in TLS) were never never fixed. So we can just set the wakeup time
from a random seed instead there. Still open is whether everybody
should be random.
This patch fixes bug 2235, which was introduced in 0.2.2.18-alpha.
Diagnosed with help from boboper on irc.
---
changes/bug2235 | 3 +++
src/or/hibernate.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug2235 b/changes/bug2235
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c3bafa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug2235
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes
+ - Avoid crashes when AccountingMax is set on clients. Fixes bug 2235;
+ Bugfix on 0.2.2.18-alpha. Diagnosed by boboper.
diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c
index 04e06c8..dfc4edf 100644
--- a/src/or/hibernate.c
+++ b/src/or/hibernate.c
@@ -463,14 +463,19 @@ accounting_set_wakeup_time(void)
}
}
- format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time);
- crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
-
- d_env = crypto_new_digest_env();
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN);
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- crypto_free_digest_env(d_env);
+ if (server_identity_key_is_set()) {
+ format_iso_time(buf, interval_start_time);
+
+ crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
+
+ d_env = crypto_new_digest_env();
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, buf, ISO_TIME_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(d_env, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ crypto_free_digest_env(d_env);
+ } else {
+ crypto_rand(digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
if (!expected_bandwidth_usage) {
char buf1[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
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