[tor-commits] r24503: {website} Update mailing list archive links (in website/trunk: docs/en eff/en getinvolved/en)
Robert Ransom
rransom.8774 at gmail.com
Tue Mar 29 21:17:34 UTC 2011
Author: rransom
Date: 2011-03-29 21:17:33 +0000 (Tue, 29 Mar 2011)
New Revision: 24503
Modified:
website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml
website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
Log:
Update mailing list archive links
Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-03-29 21:17:16 UTC (rev 24502)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-03-29 21:17:33 UTC (rev 24503)
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@
<li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal
buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a
- href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jun-2008/msg00001.html">release
+ href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519.html">release
unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL
1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use
this feature.</li>
Modified: website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml 2011-03-29 21:17:16 UTC (rev 24502)
+++ website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml 2011-03-29 21:17:33 UTC (rev 24503)
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
and help set a clear legal precedent establishing that merely running
a node does not create copyright liability for either node operators
or their bandwidth providers. If you want to be the EFF's test case,
-<a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Oct-2005/msg00208.html">read
+<a href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2005-October/016301.html">read
more here</a>.</p>
<a id="ExitSnooping"></a>
Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2011-03-29 21:17:16 UTC (rev 24502)
+++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml 2011-03-29 21:17:33 UTC (rev 24503)
@@ -724,8 +724,8 @@
addresses and algorithms for gathering and blocking them. See <a
href="<blog>bridge-distribution-strategies">our
blog post on the topic</a> as an overview, and then look at <a
- href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Dec-2009/msg00000.html">Roger's
- or-dev post</a> from December for more recent thoughts — lots of
+ href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2009-December/000666.html">Roger's
+ or-dev post</a> from December 2009 for more recent thoughts — lots of
design work remains.</p>
<p>If you want to get more into the guts of Tor itself (C), a more minor problem
we should address is that current Tors can only listen on a single
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