[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.2.2] Clarify threat description and avoid negative uptimes.

[nickm at torproject.org]

commit 3a0c6021556abc96f4c610d5e097e3890216595f
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date:   Fri Mar 11 13:03:25 2011 -0500

    Clarify threat description and avoid negative uptimes.
---
 changes/hsdir_assignment |    7 ++++---
 src/or/rephist.c         |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/hsdir_assignment b/changes/hsdir_assignment
index ba01990..5c04b9b 100644
--- a/changes/hsdir_assignment
+++ b/changes/hsdir_assignment
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
     - Directory authorities now use data collected from rephist when
       choosing whether to assign the HSDir flag to relays, instead of
       trusting the uptime value the relay reports in its descriptor.
-      This helps prevent an attack where relatively few malaicious
-      nodes can blackhole any given hidden service. Bugfix on
-      0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709.
+      This helps prevent an attack where a small set of nodes with
+      frequently-changing identity keys can blackhole a hidden service.
+      (Only authorities need upgrade; others will be fine once they do.)
+      Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha; fixes bug 2709.
diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c
index 69001de..e4afe62 100644
--- a/src/or/rephist.c
+++ b/src/or/rephist.c
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ rep_hist_get_uptime(const char *id, time_t when)
   or_history_t *hist = get_or_history(id);
   if (!hist)
     return 0;
-  if (!hist->start_of_run)
+  if (!hist->start_of_run || when < hist->start_of_run)
     return 0;
   return when - hist->start_of_run;
 }