[or-cvs] r24174: {website} get rid of trailing whitespace; no real changes (website/trunk/docs/en)
Roger Dingledine
arma at torproject.org
Wed Feb 2 04:58:23 UTC 2011
Author: arma
Date: 2011-02-02 04:58:23 +0000 (Wed, 02 Feb 2011)
New Revision: 24174
Modified:
website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
Log:
get rid of trailing whitespace; no real changes
Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-02-01 19:30:18 UTC (rev 24173)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2011-02-02 04:58:23 UTC (rev 24174)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
<!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
<h1>Tor FAQ</h1>
<hr>
-
+
<p>General questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></li>
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
funding?</a></li>
<li><a href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>Compilation and Installation:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></li>
@@ -42,9 +42,9 @@
have a virus or spyware?</a></li>
<li><a href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that includes Tor?</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>Running Tor:</p>
-
+
<p>Running a Tor client:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#DoesntWork">I installed Tor and Polipo but it's not
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
<li><a href="#GmailWarning">Gmail warns me that my account may have
been compromised.</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>Running a Tor relay:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay need to be?</a></li>
@@ -69,41 +69,41 @@
<li><a href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so much memory?</a></li>
<li><a href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>Running a Tor hidden service:</p>
-
+
<p>Anonymity and Security:</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys Tor uses.</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>Alternate designs that we don't do (yet):</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor user be a
relay.</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>Abuse</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad things?</a></li>
<li><a href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my exit
relay?</a></li>
</ul>
-
+
<p>For other questions not yet on this version of the FAQ, see the <a
href="<wikifaq>">wiki FAQ</a> for now.</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="General"></a>
-
+
<a id="WhatIsTor"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhatIsTor">What is Tor?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
The name "Tor" can refer to several different components.
</p>
-
+
<p>
The Tor software is a program you can run on your computer that helps keep
you safe on the Internet. Tor protects you by bouncing your communications
@@ -114,14 +114,14 @@
called the Tor network. You can read more about how Tor works on the <a
href="<page about/overview>">overview page</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
The Tor Project is a non-profit (charity) organization that maintains
and develops the Tor software.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="Torisdifferent"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Torisdifferent">How is Tor different from other proxies?</a></h3>
<p>
@@ -172,13 +172,13 @@
encryption, what data you're sending to the destination.</dd>
</dl>
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="CompatibleApplications"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompatibleApplications">What programs can
I use with Tor?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
There are two pieces to "Torifying" a program: connection-level anonymity
and application-level anonymity. Connection-level anonymity focuses on
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@
second step needs to be done on a program-by-program basis, which is
why we don't yet recommend very many programs for safe use with Tor.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Most of our work so far has focused on the Firefox web browser. The
bundles on the <a href="<page download/download>">download page</a> automatically
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@
Torbutton now takes care of a lot of the connection-level and
application-level worries.
</p>
-
+
<p>
There are plenty of other programs you can use with Tor,
but we haven't researched the application-level anonymity
@@ -213,12 +213,12 @@
of applications that help you direct your traffic through Tor</a>.
Please add to these lists and help us keep them accurate!
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="WhyCalledTor"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyCalledTor">Why is it called Tor?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Because Tor is the onion routing network. When we were starting the
new next-generation design and implementation of onion routing in
@@ -228,11 +228,11 @@
href="http://www.onion-router.net/">onion routing project</a> run by
the Naval Research Lab.
</p>
-
+
<p>
(It's also got a fine translation from German and Turkish.)
</p>
-
+
<p>
Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled
"TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually
@@ -240,19 +240,19 @@
everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they
spell it wrong.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="Backdoor"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Backdoor">Is there a backdoor in Tor?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us to put one
in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it's unlikely that anybody
will try to make us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do
ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say) probably win.
</p>
-
+
<p>
We think that putting a backdoor in Tor would be tremendously
irresponsible to our users, and a bad precedent for security software
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@
software, it would ruin our professional reputations. Nobody would
trust our software ever again — for excellent reason!
</p>
-
+
<p>
But that said, there are still plenty of subtle attacks
people might try. Somebody might impersonate us, or break into our
@@ -272,37 +272,37 @@
signatures</a> on the releases, to make sure nobody messed with the
distribution sites.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Also, there might be accidental bugs in Tor that could affect your
anonymity. We periodically find and fix anonymity-related bugs, so make
sure you keep your Tor versions up-to-date.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="DistributingTor"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#DistributingTor">Can I distribute Tor on
my magazine's CD?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Yes.
</p>
-
+
<p>
The Tor software is <a href="https://www.fsf.org/">free software</a>. This
means we give you the rights to redistribute the Tor software, either
modified or unmodified, either for a fee or gratis. You don't have to
ask us for specific permission.
</p>
-
+
<p>
However, if you want to redistribute the Tor software you must follow our
<a href="<gitblob>LICENSE">LICENSE</a>.
Essentially this means that you need to include our LICENSE file along
with whatever part of the Tor software you're distributing.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Most people who ask us this question don't want to distribute just the
Tor software, though. They want to distribute the Tor bundles, which
@@ -318,13 +318,13 @@
href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/">Polipo
download page</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Also, you should make sure not to confuse your readers about what Tor is,
who makes it, and what properties it provides (and doesn't provide). See
our <a href="<page docs/trademark-faq>">trademark FAQ</a> for details.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Lastly, you should realize that we release new versions of the
Tor software frequently, and sometimes we make backward incompatible
@@ -332,9 +332,9 @@
may not be supported — or even work — six months later. This
is a fact of life for all security software under heavy development.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="SupportMail"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#SupportMail">How can I get an answer to my
Tor support mail?</a></h3>
@@ -352,20 +352,19 @@
volunteers who may be able to help you but you may not get a response
for days.</li>
</ol>
-
-
+
<p>If you find your answer, please stick around on the IRC channel or the
mailing list and answer questions from others.</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="WhySlow"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhySlow">Why is Tor so slow?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
There are many reasons why the Tor network is currently slow.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Before we answer, though, you should realize that Tor is never going to
be blazing fast. Your traffic is bouncing through volunteers' computers
@@ -373,46 +372,46 @@
will always be present. You shouldn't expect to see university-style
bandwidth through Tor.
</p>
-
+
<p>
But that doesn't mean that it can't be improved. The current Tor network
is quite small compared to the number of people trying to use it, and
many of these users don't understand or care that Tor can't currently
handle file-sharing traffic load.
</p>
-
+
<p>
For the much more in-depth answer, see <a
href="<blog>why-tor-is-slow">Roger's blog
post on the topic</a>, which includes both a detailed PDF and a video
to go with it.
</p>
-
+
<p>
What can you do to help?
</p>
-
+
<ul>
-
+
<li>
<a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Configure your Tor to relay traffic
for others</a>. Help make the Tor network large enough that we can handle
all the users who want privacy and security on the Internet.
</li>
-
+
<li>
<a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Help us make Tor more usable</a>. We
especially need people to help make it easier to configure your Tor
as a relay. Also, we need help with clear simple documentation to
walk people through setting it up.
</li>
-
+
<li>
There are some bottlenecks in the current Tor network. Help us design
experiments to track down and demonstrate where the problems are, and
then we can focus better on fixing them.
</li>
-
+
<li>
There are some steps that individuals
can take to improve their Tor performance. <a
@@ -423,20 +422,20 @@
to the latest version of Tor</a>. If this works well, please help by
documenting what you did, and letting us know about it.
</li>
-
+
<li>
Tor needs some architectural changes too. One important change is to
start providing <a href="#EverybodyARelay">better service to people who
relay traffic</a>. We're working on this, and we'll finish faster if we
get to spend more time on it.
</li>
-
+
<li>
Help do other things so we can do the hard stuff. Please take a moment
to figure out what your skills and interests are, and then <a href="<page
getinvolved/volunteer>">look at our volunteer page</a>.
</li>
-
+
<li>
Help find sponsors for Tor. Do you work at a company or government agency
that uses Tor or has a use for Internet privacy, e.g. to browse the
@@ -445,46 +444,46 @@
an interest in keeping the Tor network working, please contact them about
supporting Tor. Without sponsors, Tor is going to become even slower.
</li>
-
+
<li>
If you can't help out with any of the above, you can still help out
individually by <a href="<page donate/donate>">donating a bit of money to the
cause</a>. It adds up!
</li>
-
+
</ul>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="Funding"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Funding">What would The Tor Project do with
more funding?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
We have about 1800 relays right now, pushing over 150 MB/s average
traffic. We have several hundred thousand active users. But the Tor
network is not yet self-sustaining.
</p>
-
+
<p>
There are six main development/maintenance pushes that need attention:
</p>
-
+
<ul>
-
+
<li>
Scalability: We need to keep scaling and decentralizing the Tor
architecture so it can handle thousands of relays and millions of
users. The upcoming stable release is a major improvement, but there's
lots more to be done next in terms of keeping Tor fast and stable.
</li>
-
+
<li>
User support: With this many users, a lot of people are asking questions
all the time, offering to help out with things, and so on. We need good
clean docs, and we need to spend some effort coordinating volunteers.
</li>
-
+
<li>
Relay support: the Tor network is run by volunteers, but they still need
attention with prompt bug fixes, explanations when things go wrong,
@@ -493,7 +492,7 @@
happy. We also need to work on <a href="#RelayOS">stability</a> on some
platforms — e.g., Tor relays have problems on Win XP currently.
</li>
-
+
<li>
Usability: Beyond documentation, we also need to work on usability of the
software itself. This includes installers, clean GUIs, easy configuration
@@ -502,14 +501,14 @@
with the <a href="<page projects/vidalia>">Vidalia GUI</a>, but much more work
remains — usability for privacy software has never been easy.
</li>
-
+
<li>
Incentives: We need to work on ways to encourage people to configure
their Tors as relays and exit nodes rather than just clients.
<a href="#EverybodyARelay">We need to make it easy to become a relay,
and we need to give people incentives to do it.</a>
</li>
-
+
<li>
Research: The anonymous communications field is full
of surprises and gotchas. In our copious free time, we
@@ -520,9 +519,9 @@
attacks out there. Of course, there are more research questions waiting
behind these.
</li>
-
+
</ul>
-
+
<p>
We're continuing to move forward on all of these, but at this rate
<a href="#WhySlow">the Tor network is growing faster than the developers
@@ -530,35 +529,38 @@
Now would be an excellent time to add a few more developers to the effort
so we can continue to grow the network.
</p>
-
+
<p>
We are also excited about tackling related problems, such as
censorship-resistance.
</p>
-
+
<p>
We are proud to have <a href="<page about/sponsors>">sponsorship and support</a>
from the Omidyar Network, the International Broadcasting Bureau, Bell
Security Solutions, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, several government
agencies and research groups, and hundreds of private contributors.
</p>
-
+
<p>
However, this support is not enough to keep Tor abreast of changes in the
Internet privacy landscape. Please <a href="<page donate/donate>">donate</a>
to the project, or <a href="<page about/contact>">contact</a> our executive
director for information on making grants or major donations.
</p>
-
+
<a id="Metrics"></a>
- <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor? How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>
+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Metrics">How many people use Tor?
+ How many relays or exit nodes are there?</a></h3>
- <p>All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>
+ <p>All this and more about measuring Tor can be found at the <a
+ href="https://metrics.torproject.org">Tor Metrics Portal</a>.</p>
<hr>
-
+
<a id="HowUninstallTor"></a>
- <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall Tor?</a></h3>
-
+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#HowUninstallTor">How do I uninstall
+ Tor?</a></h3>
+
<p>
This depends entirely on how you installed it and which operating system you
have. If you installed a package, then hopefully your package has a way to
@@ -566,7 +568,7 @@
completely remove Tor, Vidalia, Torbutton for Firefox, and Polipo on any
version of Windows is as follows:
</p>
-
+
<ol>
<li>In your taskbar, right click on Vidalia (the green onion or the black head)
and choose exit.</li>
@@ -577,63 +579,63 @@
<li>Start Firefox. Go to the Tools menu, choose Add-ons. Select Torbutton.
Click the Uninstall button.</li>
</ol>
-
+
<p>
If you do not follow these steps (for example by trying to uninstall
Vidalia, Tor, and Polipo while they are still running), you will need to
reboot and manually remove the directory "Program Files\Vidalia Bundle".
</p>
-
+
<p>
For Mac OS X, follow the <a
href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>#uninstall">uninstall directions</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
If you installed by source, I'm afraid there is no easy uninstall method. But
on the bright side, by default it only installs into /usr/local/ and it should
be pretty easy to notice things there.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="PGPSigs"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#PGPSigs">What are these "sig" files on the
download page?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
These are PGP signatures, so you can verify that the file you've downloaded is
exactly the one that we intended you to get.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Please read the <a
href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">verifying signatures</a> page for details.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="CompileTorWindows"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#CompileTorWindows">How do I compile Tor under
Windows?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Try following the steps at <a href="<gitblob>doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt">
tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
(Note that you don't need to compile Tor yourself in order to use
it. Most people just use the packages available on the <a href="<page
download/download>">download page</a>.)
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="VirusFalsePositives"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#VirusFalsePositives">Why does my Tor
executable appear to have a virus or spyware?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Sometimes, overzealous Windows virus and spyware detectors trigger on some
parts of the Tor Windows binary. Our best guess is that these are false
@@ -641,30 +643,30 @@
guessing game anyway. You should contact your vendor and explain that you have
a program that seems to be triggering false positives. Or pick a better vendor.
</p>
-
+
<p>
In the meantime, we encourage you to not just take our word for
it. Our job is to provide the source; if you're concerned, please do <a
href="#CompileTorWindows">recompile it yourself</a>.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="LiveCD"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#LiveCD">Is there a LiveCD or other bundle that
includes Tor?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
There isn't any official LiveCD at this point. We're still trying to find good
solutions and trying to understand the security and anonymity implications of
the various options. In the mean time, feel free to check out the list below
and use your best judgement:
</p>
-
+
<p>
LiveCDs:
</p>
-
+
<ol>
<li><a href="https://amnesia.boum.org/">The (Amnesic) Incognito Live
System</a> is a Live System aimed at preserving your privacy and
@@ -689,11 +691,11 @@
bookmarks and other settings or data on an encrypted usb-key</li>
</li>
</ol>
-
+
<p>
Windows bundles:
</p>
-
+
<ol>
<li><a href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser Bundle</a>
for Windows comes with a pre-configured web browser and is self contained
@@ -707,11 +709,11 @@
previously known as Torpark, is a Firefox+Tor package for Win32 that can
installed on a USB key. It needs a host Win32 operating system.</li>
</ol>
-
+
<p>
Not currently maintained as far as we know:
</p>
-
+
<ol>
<li>Polippix / Privatlivets Fred is a Danish Knoppix-based LiveCD with Tor
and utilities to encrypt IP-telephony. <a href="http://polippix.org/">Info and
@@ -734,7 +736,7 @@
get it from the <a href="http://phantomix.ytternhagen.de/">Phantomix
Website</a>.</li>
</ol>
-
+
<p>
Please contact us if you know any others.
</p>
@@ -888,14 +890,14 @@
</ol>
<hr>
-
+
<a id="ChooseEntryExit"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#ChooseEntryExit">Can I control which nodes (or country) are used for entry/exit?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
- Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
- inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.
- The following options can be added to your config file "torrc"
+ Yes. You can set preferred entry and exit nodes as well as
+ inform Tor which nodes you do not want to use.
+ The following options can be added to your config file "torrc"
or specified on the command line:
</p>
<dl>
@@ -903,47 +905,46 @@
<dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
</dd>
<dt><tt>ExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
- <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.
+ <dd>A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.
</dd>
<dt><tt>ExcludeNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
- <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.
+ <dd>A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.
</dd>
<dt><tt>ExcludeExitNodes $fingerprint,$fingerprint,...</tt></dt>
- <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.
- Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list.
+ <dd>A list of nodes to never use when picking an exit.
+ Nodes listed in <tt>ExcludeNodes</tt> are automatically in this list.
</dd>
</dl>
<p>
- <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>
- — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions.
- You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the route selection to Tor;
- overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.
+ <em>We recommend you do not use these</em>
+ — they are intended for testing and may disappear in future versions.
+ You get the best security that Tor can provide when you leave the
+ route selection to Tor; overriding the entry / exit nodes can mess
+ up your anonymity in ways we don't understand.
</p>
<p>
- The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are treated as a request,
- meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow, Tor will still avoid them.
- You can make the option mandatory by setting
- <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt>
- — but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working
- if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable.
- See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a>
+ The <tt>EntryNodes</tt> and <tt>ExitNodes</tt> config options are
+ treated as a request, meaning if the nodes are down or seem slow,
+ Tor will still avoid them. You can make the option mandatory by
+ setting <tt>StrictExitNodes 1</tt> or <tt>StrictEntryNodes 1</tt>
+ — but if you do, your Tor connections will stop working
+ if all of the nodes you have specified become unreachable.
+ See the <a href="<page docs/documentation>#NeatLinks">Tor status pages</a>
for some nodes you might pick.
</p>
<p>
- Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify
- a 2 letter ISO3166 country code in curly braces
- (for example {de}),
- or an ip address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8),
- or a node nickname.
- Make sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items.
+ Instead of <tt>$fingerprint</tt> you can also specify a 2 letter
+ ISO3166 country code in curly braces (for example {de}), or an ip
+ address pattern (for example 255.254.0.0/8), or a node nickname. Make
+ sure there are no spaces between the commas and the list items.
</p>
<p>
- If you want to access a service directly through Tor's SOCKS interface
- (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to
- set up an internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>.
+ If you want to access a service directly through Tor's SOCKS interface
+ (eg. using ssh via connect.c), another option is to set up an
+ internal mapping in your configuration file using <tt>MapAddress</tt>.
See the manual page for details.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
<a id="GoogleCaptcha"></a>
@@ -1035,11 +1036,11 @@
<a id="RelayFlexible"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayFlexible">How stable does my relay
need to be?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
We aim to make setting up a Tor relay easy and convenient:
</p>
-
+
<ul>
<li>Tor has built-in support for <a
href="<wikifaq>#LimitBandwidth">
@@ -1064,8 +1065,8 @@
</li>
<li>If your relay is behind a NAT and it doesn't know its public
IP (e.g. it has an IP of 192.168.x.y), you'll need to set up port
- forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but
- <a href="<wikifaq>#ServerForFirewalledClients">this FAQ entry</a>
+ forwarding. Forwarding TCP connections is system dependent but
+ <a href="<wikifaq>#ServerForFirewalledClients">this FAQ entry</a>
offers some examples on how to do this.
</li>
<li>Your relay will passively estimate and advertise its recent
@@ -1073,18 +1074,18 @@
low-bandwidth ones. Therefore having low-bandwidth relays is useful too.
</li>
</ul>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="RunARelayBut"></a>
<a id="ExitPolicies"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#ExitPolicies">I'd run a relay, but I don't
want to deal with abuse issues.</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Great. That's exactly why we implemented exit policies.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Each Tor relay has an exit policy that specifies what sort of
outbound connections are allowed or refused from that relay. The exit
@@ -1092,27 +1093,27 @@
will automatically avoid picking exit relays that would refuse to
exit to their intended destination. This way each relay can decide
the services, hosts, and networks he wants to allow connections to,
- based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on
- <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a>
- if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's
+ based on abuse potential and his own situation. Read the FAQ entry on
+ <a href="<page docs/faq-abuse>#TypicalAbuses">issues you might encounter</a>
+ if you use the default exit policy, and then read Mike Perry's
<a href="<blog>tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment">tips
for running an exit node with minimal harassment</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
- The default exit policy allows access to many popular services (e.g. web browsing), but
- <a href="<wikifaq>#DefaultPorts">restricts</a>
+ The default exit policy allows access to many popular services
+ (e.g. web browsing), but <a href="<wikifaq>#DefaultPorts">restricts</a>
some due to abuse potential (e.g. mail) and some since
the Tor network can't handle the load (e.g. default
file-sharing ports). You can change your exit policy
- using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your
+ using Vidalia's "Sharing" tab, or by manually editing your
<a href="<wikifaq>#torrc">torrc</a>
file. If you want to avoid most if not all abuse potential, set it to
"reject *:*" (or un-check all the boxes in Vidalia). This setting means
that your relay will be used for relaying traffic inside the Tor network,
but not for connections to external websites or other services.
</p>
-
+
<p>
If you do allow any exit connections, make sure name resolution works
(that is, your computer can resolve Internet addresses correctly).
@@ -1121,25 +1122,25 @@
explicitly reject them in your exit policy — otherwise Tor users
will be impacted too.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="RelayOrBridge"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayOrBridge">Should I be a normal relay
or bridge relay?</a></h3>
-
+
<p><a href="<page docs/bridges>">Bridge relays</a> (or "bridges" for short)
are <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">Tor relays</a> that aren't listed
in the main Tor directory. That means
that even an ISP or government trying to filter connections to the Tor
network probably won't be able to block all the bridges.
</p>
-
+
<p>Being a normal relay vs being a bridge relay is almost the same
configuration: it's just a matter of whether your relay is listed
publically or not.
</p>
-
+
<p>Right now, there are a small number of places in the world that filter
connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running
right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does
@@ -1147,25 +1148,25 @@
security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a
public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.
</p>
-
+
<p>So should you run a normal relay or bridge relay? If you have
lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal relay —
- bridge relays see very little use these days. If you're willing to
+ bridge relays see very little use these days. If you're willing to
<a href="#ExitPolicies">be an exit</a>, you should definitely run a normal
relay, since we need more exits. If you can't be an exit and only have
a little bit of bandwidth, then flip a coin. Thanks for volunteering!
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="RelayMemory"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#RelayMemory">Why is my Tor relay using so
much memory?</a></h3>
-
+
<p>If your Tor relay is using more memory than you'd like, here are some
tips for reducing its footprint:
</p>
-
+
<ol>
<li>If you're on Linux, you may be encountering memory fragmentation
bugs in glibc's malloc implementation. That is, when Tor releases memory
@@ -1174,7 +1175,7 @@
which doesn't have as many fragmentation bugs (but the tradeoff is higher
CPU load). You can tell Tor to use this malloc implementation instead:
<tt>./configure --enable-openbsd-malloc</tt></li>
-
+
<li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal
buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a
@@ -1182,31 +1183,32 @@
unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL
1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use
this feature.</li>
-
+
<li>If you're running on Solaris, OpenBSD, NetBSD, or
old FreeBSD, Tor is probably forking separate processes
rather than using threads. Consider switching to a <a
href="<wikifaq>#RelayOS">better
operating system</a>.</li>
-
+
<li>If you still can't handle the memory load, consider reducing the
amount of bandwidth your relay advertises. Advertising less bandwidth
means you will attract fewer users, so your relay shouldn't grow
as large. See the <tt>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</tt> option in the man
page.</li>
-
+
</ol>
-
+
<p>
All of this said, fast Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual
for a fast exit relay to use 500-1000 MB of memory.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="WhyNotNamed"></a>
- <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not named?</a></h3>
-
+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#WhyNotNamed">Why is my Tor relay not
+ named?</a></h3>
+
<p>
We currently use these metrics to determine if your relay should be named:<br>
</p>
@@ -1216,13 +1218,13 @@
<li>The relay must have been around for at least two weeks.</li>
<li>No other router may have wanted the same name in the past month.</li>
</ul>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="KeyManagement"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#KeyManagement">Tell me about all the keys
Tor uses.</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Tor uses a variety of different keys, with three goals in mind: 1)
encryption to ensure privacy of data within the Tor network, 2)
@@ -1230,7 +1232,7 @@
talking to the relays they meant to talk to, and 3) signatures to make
sure all clients know the same set of relays.
</p>
-
+
<p>
<b>Encryption</b>: first, all connections in Tor use TLS link encryption,
so observers can't look inside to see which circuit a given cell is
@@ -1240,7 +1242,7 @@
so logging traffic and then breaking into the relay to discover the key
won't work.
</p>
-
+
<p>
<b>Authentication</b>:
Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
@@ -1250,7 +1252,7 @@
the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.
Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
</p>
-
+
<p>
<b>Coordination</b>:
How do clients know what the relays are, and how do they know that they
@@ -1264,14 +1266,14 @@
a threshold of the directory authorities, he can't trick the Tor client
into using other Tor relays.
</p>
-
+
<p>
How do clients know what the directory authorities are? The Tor software
comes with a built-in list of location and public key for each directory
authority. So the only way to trick users into using a fake Tor network
is to give them a specially modified version of the software.
</p>
-
+
<p>
How do users know they've got the right software? When we distribute
the source code or a package, we digitally sign it with <a
@@ -1279,7 +1281,7 @@
href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">instructions
on how to check Tor's signatures</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
In order to be certain that it's really signed by us, you need to have
met us in person and gotten a copy of our GPG key fingerprint, or you
@@ -1287,13 +1289,13 @@
this level, we recommend you get involved with the security community
and start meeting people.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="EverybodyARelay"></a>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#EverybodyARelay">You should make every Tor
user be a relay.</a></h3>
-
+
<p>
Requiring every Tor user to be a relay would help with scaling the
network to handle all our users, and <a href="<wikifaq>#RelayAnonymity">running a Tor
@@ -1305,7 +1307,7 @@
are subject to these or similar constraints and including these clients
increases the size of the anonymity set.
</p>
-
+
<p>
That said, we do want to encourage Tor users to run relays, so what we
really want to do is simplify the process of setting up and maintaining
@@ -1314,11 +1316,11 @@
uPnP too. Tor is good at automatically detecting whether it's reachable and
how much bandwidth it can offer.
</p>
-
+
<p>
There are five steps we need to address before we can do this though:
</p>
-
+
<p>
First, we need to make Tor stable as a relay on all common
operating systems. The main remaining platform is Windows,
@@ -1326,7 +1328,7 @@
href="https://www.torproject.org/press/2008-12-19-roadmap-press-release">our
development roadmap</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Second, we still need to get better at automatically estimating
the right amount of bandwidth to allow. See item #7 on the
@@ -1337,7 +1339,7 @@
to UDP transport</a> is the simplest answer here — which alas is
not a very simple answer at all.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Third, we need to work on scalability, both of the network (how to
stop requiring that all Tor relays be able to connect to all Tor
@@ -1347,7 +1349,7 @@
href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Fourth, we need to better understand the risks from
letting the attacker send traffic through your relay while
@@ -1363,41 +1365,41 @@
<a href="<page docs/bridges>">bridge relays</a> or as normal relays), then
we need to understand this threat better and learn how to mitigate it.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Fifth, we might need some sort of incentive scheme to encourage people
to relay traffic for others, and/or to become exit nodes. Here are our
<a href="<blog>two-incentive-designs-tor">current
thoughts on Tor incentives</a>.
</p>
-
+
<p>
Please help on all of these!
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="Criminals"></a>
- <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals to do bad
- things?</a></h3>
-
+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#Criminals">Doesn't Tor enable criminals
+ to do bad things?</a></h3>
+
<p>
For the answer to this question and others, please see our <a
href="<page docs/faq-abuse>">Tor Abuse FAQ</a>.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
-
+
<a id="RespondISP"></a>
- <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP about my
- exit relay?</a></h3>
-
+ <h3><a class="anchor" href="#RespondISP">How do I respond to my ISP
+ about my exit relay?</a></h3>
+
<p>
A collection of templates for successfully responding to ISPs is <a
href="<wiki>TheOnionRouter/TorAbuseTemplates">collected
here</a>.
</p>
-
+
<hr>
</div>
@@ -1409,4 +1411,4 @@
<!-- END SIDECOL -->
</div>
<!-- END CONTENT -->
-#include <foot.wmi>
+#include <foot.wmi>
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