[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.2.2] refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
arma at torproject.org
arma at torproject.org
Wed Apr 27 18:06:27 UTC 2011
commit 82178a81f6748c9b26bdc8a5da36dd34b689281b
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date: Sat Oct 17 18:52:18 2009 -0400
refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
Make hidden services more flaky for people who set both ExcludeNodes
and StrictNodes. Not recommended, especially for hidden service operators.
---
src/or/rendclient.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
src/or/rendservice.c | 14 +++++++++++-
2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 8ac909f..90304c3 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
#include "rephist.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
+static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(
+ const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict);
+
/** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point:
* send the introduction request. */
void
@@ -739,10 +742,31 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query)
extend_info_t *
rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
+ extend_info_t *result;
+ /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */
+ if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1)))
+ return result;
+ /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node
+ */
+ if (!get_options()->StrictNodes)
+ return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set
+ * iff <b>strict</b> is true.
+ */
+static extend_info_t *
+rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query,
+ const int strict)
+{
int i;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
routerinfo_t *router;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ smartlist_t *usable_nodes;
+ int n_excluded = 0;
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
@@ -750,13 +774,26 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
return NULL;
}
+ /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty,
+ * no nodes are usable. */
+ usable_nodes = smartlist_create();
+ smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes);
again:
- if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0)
+ if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) {
+ if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) {
+ /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise
+ * we're just about to retry anyways.
+ */
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are "
+ "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping.");
+ }
+ smartlist_free(usable_nodes);
return NULL;
+ }
- i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
- intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes));
+ intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i);
/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) {
if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest))
@@ -766,13 +803,22 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
if (!router) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.",
intro->extend_info->nickname);
- rend_intro_point_free(intro);
- smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
goto again;
}
extend_info_free(intro->extend_info);
intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router);
}
+ /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict &&
+ routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
+ intro->extend_info)) {
+ n_excluded++;
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_free(usable_nodes);
return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info);
}
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 4503982..88f1ba3 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now)
/** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen
* rendezvous point.
*/
+ /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */
int
rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
@@ -875,6 +876,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
time_t now = time(NULL);
char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
time_t *access_time;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
@@ -1047,6 +1050,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
goto err;
}
+ /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we "
+ "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service.");
+ reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
r_cookie = ptr;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4);
@@ -1394,7 +1406,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
/** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a
* live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is
- * now out-of-date.*/
+ * now out-of-date. */
int
rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
const uint8_t *request,
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