[tor-commits] [tor/master] Fix some 'impossible' overflow bugs in byte counting
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Thu Apr 7 16:19:39 UTC 2011
commit dddd333a80ee2e9bb731cb3c127ace3741d49673
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Fri Mar 25 16:45:25 2011 -0400
Fix some 'impossible' overflow bugs in byte counting
The first was genuinely impossible, I think: it could only happen
when the amount we read differed from the amount we wanted to read
by more than INT_MAX.
The second is just very unlikely: it would give incorrect results to
the controller if you somehow wrote or read more than 4GB on one
edge conn in one second. That one is a bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.
---
changes/count_overflow | 5 +++++
src/or/connection.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/count_overflow b/changes/count_overflow
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f302ff2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/count_overflow
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes:
+ - Correctly handle an "impossible" overflow cases in connection
+ byte counting, where we write or read more than 4GB on an edge
+ connection in single second. Bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.
+
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c
index 7fa6cd9..084237d 100644
--- a/src/or/connection.c
+++ b/src/or/connection.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn);
-static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read,
+static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read,
int *socket_error);
static int connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial);
static void client_check_address_changed(int sock);
@@ -2338,7 +2338,7 @@ connection_bucket_should_increase(int bucket, or_connection_t *conn)
static int
connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn)
{
- int max_to_read=-1, try_to_read;
+ ssize_t max_to_read=-1, try_to_read;
size_t before, n_read = 0;
int socket_error = 0;
@@ -2456,7 +2456,8 @@ connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn)
* Return -1 if we want to break conn, else return 0.
*/
static int
-connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error)
+connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read,
+ int *socket_error)
{
int result;
ssize_t at_most = *max_to_read;
@@ -2574,15 +2575,19 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error)
n_read = (size_t) result;
}
- if (n_read > 0) { /* change *max_to_read */
- /*XXXX022 check for overflow*/
- *max_to_read = (int)(at_most - n_read);
- }
+ if (n_read > 0) {
+ /* change *max_to_read */
+ *max_to_read = at_most - n_read;
- if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
- edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
- /*XXXX022 check for overflow*/
- edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read;
+ /* Update edge_conn->n_read */
+ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
+ edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
+ /* Check for overflow: */
+ if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_read > n_read))
+ edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read;
+ else
+ edge_conn->n_read = UINT32_MAX;
+ }
}
connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written);
@@ -2781,10 +2786,13 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
n_written = (size_t) result;
}
- if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
+ if (n_written && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
- /*XXXX022 check for overflow.*/
- edge_conn->n_written += (int)n_written;
+ /* Check for overflow: */
+ if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_written > n_written))
+ edge_conn->n_written += n_written;
+ else
+ edge_conn->n_written = UINT32_MAX;
}
connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written);
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