[or-cvs] r23187: {projects} put my italics back in also lose the OPC fannery (projects/articles)

[Roger Dingledine]

Author: arma
Date: 2010-09-14 18:05:39 +0000 (Tue, 14 Sep 2010)
New Revision: 23187

Modified:
   projects/articles/circumvention-features.pdf
   projects/articles/circumvention-features.tex
Log:
put my italics back in
also lose the OPC fannery


Modified: projects/articles/circumvention-features.pdf
===================================================================
(Binary files differ)

Modified: projects/articles/circumvention-features.tex
===================================================================
--- projects/articles/circumvention-features.tex	2010-09-14 17:57:33 UTC (rev 23186)
+++ projects/articles/circumvention-features.tex	2010-09-14 18:05:39 UTC (rev 23187)
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@
 shouldn't conclude the first feature is the most critical.
 
 Internet-based circumvention software consists of two components: a
-relaying component and a discovery component. The relaying component is
+\emph{relaying} component and a \emph{discovery} component. The relaying
+component is
 what establishes a connection to some server or proxy, handles encryption,
 and sends traffic back and forth. The discovery component is the step
 before that -- the process of finding one or more reachable addresses.
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@
 privacy? What kind and against what attackers? In what way does it
 use encryption? Do they intend for it to stand up to attacks from
 censors? What kind of attacks do they expect to resist and why will
-their tool resist them? Without seeing the source code and knowing what
+their tool resist them? Without seeing the source code \emph{and} knowing what
 the developers meant for it to do, it's harder to decide whether there
 are security problems in the tool, or to evaluate whether it will reach
 its goals.
@@ -189,12 +190,12 @@
 different locations, so there is no single location or entity that gets
 to watch what websites each user is accessing.
 
-Another way to look at this division is based on whether the trust is
+Another way to look at this division is based on whether the \emph{trust} is
 centralized or decentralized. If you have to put all your trust in one
 entity, then the best you can hope for is ``privacy by policy'' -- meaning
 they have all your data and they promise not to look at it, lose it, or
-sell it. The alternative is what the Ontario Privacy Commissioner calls
-``privacy by design'' -- meaning the design of the system itself ensures
+sell it. The alternative is ``privacy by design'' or ``privacy by
+architecture'' -- meaning the design of the system itself ensures
 that users get their privacy. The openness of the design in turn lets
 everybody evaluate the level of privacy provided.
 
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@
 
 I've left out the names of the tools here because the point is not that
 some tool providers may have shared user data; the point is that any
-tool with a centralized trust architecture could share user data, and its
+tool with a centralized trust architecture \emph{could} share user data, and its
 users have no way to tell whether it's happening. Worse, even if the tool
 provider means well, the fact that all the data flows through one location
 creates an attractive target for other attackers to come snooping.
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@
 and 2) the ones that make a lot of noise. In many cases censorship is
 less about blocking all sensitive content and more about creating an
 atmosphere of repression so people end up self-censoring. Articles in
-the press threaten the censors' appearance of control, so they are forced
+the press threaten the censors' \emph{appearance} of control, so they are forced
 to respond.
 
 The lesson here is that we can control the pace of the arms
@@ -396,7 +397,7 @@
 tackle every strategy at once.
 
 Last, we should keep in mind that technology won't solve the whole
-problem. After all, firewalls are socially very successful in these
+problem. After all, firewalls are \emph{socially} very successful in these
 countries. As long as many people in censored countries are saying ``I'm so
 glad my government keeps me safe on the Internet,'' the social challenges
 are at least as important. But at the same time, there are people in