[or-cvs] r22048: {website} Now that the design paper was moved back to Subversion, fix (in website/trunk: bms de en es fi fr it ja nl pl pt ru se zh-cn)

[Steven J. Murdoch]

Author: sjm217
Date: 2010-03-25 16:12:54 +0000 (Thu, 25 Mar 2010)
New Revision: 22048

Modified:
   website/trunk/bms/faq.wml
   website/trunk/de/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/en/faq.wml
   website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/es/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/fr/faq.wml
   website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/it/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/it/faq.wml
   website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/pl/faq.wml
   website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml
   website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml
   website/trunk/se/documentation.wml
   website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml
Log:
Now that the design paper was moved back to Subversion, fix links (see tor.git changeset f164a76 and svn revision r21665). Found by katoda

Modified: website/trunk/bms/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/bms/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/bms/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@
 <p>
 <b>Authentication</b>: Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called
 the "onion key".  When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
 that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way the first
 node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.  Each relay rotates
 its onion key once a week.
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@
 the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor users know about all Tor
 relays). Changes like this can have large impact on potential and actual
 anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper for
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper for
 details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/de/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/de/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/de/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">Video</a>, <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">Folien</a>, <a
 href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html">Kurzdarstellung</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">Designvorschlag</a>) und
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">Designvorschlag</a>) und
 Rogers Vortrag <q>Current events in 2007</q> vom 24C3 aus dem Dezember 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4">Video</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-24c3.pdf">Folien</a>, <a
@@ -153,13 +153,13 @@
   <ul>
     <li>Das <b>Designdokument</b> (zur Usenix Security 2004 veröffentlicht)
       gibt dir unsere Einstellungen und Sicherheitsanalyse zum Tor-Design:
-      <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF-Entwurf  (engl.)</a> und
-      <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML-Entwurf (engl.)</a>
+      <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF-Entwurf  (engl.)</a> und
+      <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML-Entwurf (engl.)</a>
       stehen zur Verfügung.</li>
     <li>Das darauf folgende Papier mit dem Titel <q>challenges in low-latency
       anonymity</q> (noch im Entwurf) hat mehr Details über die letzten
       Erfahrungen und Richtungen: <a
-      href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF version
+      href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF version
       (engl.)</a>.</li>
       <li>Unsere Veröffentlichung bei der WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves
       Company: Usability and the Network Effect</b> &mdash; erklärt, warum
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
       <li>Unser vorläufiges Design, um Firewalls den Zugriff auf das
       Tornetzwerk zu erschweren, ist in <b>design of a blocking-resistant
       anonymity system</b> (<a
-      href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF-Entwurf</a>)
+      href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF-Entwurf</a>)
       beschrieben. Du kannst auch einen Blick auf die <a
       href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">Vortragsunterlagen</a>
       oder das <a

Modified: website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/de/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
 <p>Es gibt detailliertere Beschreibungen zu dem Protokoll als diese
 Seite. Schaue dir hierzu die
 <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Designbeschreibung
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Designbeschreibung
 von Tor</a> und die
 <a
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">Rendezvous-Spezifikation</a>

Modified: website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/de/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
 seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 <br />
@@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@
 overhaul if the results are good.</li>
 <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
 an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
 it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
 steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
 block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of

Modified: website/trunk/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/en/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@
 <b>Authentication</b>:
 Every Tor relay has a public decryption key called the "onion key".
 When the Tor client establishes circuits, at each step it <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demands
 that the Tor relay prove knowledge of its onion key</a>. That way
 the first node in the path can't just spoof the rest of the path.
 Each relay rotates its onion key once a week.
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@
 relays) and of the directory (how to stop requiring that all Tor
 users know about all Tor relays). Changes like this can have large
 impact on potential and actual anonymity. See Section 5 of the <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a> paper
 for details. Again, UDP transport would help here.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/en/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 <p>
 There are more detailed descriptions about the hidden service protocol than
 this one. See the
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
 for an in-depth design description and the
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">rendezvous specification</a>
 for the message formats.

Modified: website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.1.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol,
 and seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 To start, check out Shane Pope's <a
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@
 overhaul if the results are good.</li>
 <li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
 an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguishing
 it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
 steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
 block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of

Modified: website/trunk/es/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/es/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/es/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -83,12 +83,12 @@
 <li>El <b>documento de dise&ntilde;o</b> (publicado en Usenix Security 2004)
 da nuestras justificaciones y análisis de seguridad para el dise&ntilde;o de Tor:
 versiones disponibles
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> y
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> y
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 .</li>
 <li>Nuestro documento de reafirmación en <b>desafíos en el anonimato de baja latencia</b>
 (todavía en forma de borrador) detalla experiencias y direcciones mas recientes:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">versión PDF</a>.</li>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">versión PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Nuestro artículo en WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect (Al anonimato le encanta la compañía:
 Usabilidad y el efecto en red)</b> &mdash; explica porqué la usabilidad
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@
 <li>Nuestro diseño preliminar para hacer más difícil que cortafuegos grandes
 eviten el acceso a la red Tor se describe en 
 <b>el diseño de un sistema de anonimato resistente al bloqueo</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">borrador PDF</a> y
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">borrador HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">borrador PDF</a> y
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">borrador HTML</a>.
 También puede ver <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">transparencias</a> y <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">vídeo</a>

Modified: website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/es/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
 de destino (en los nodos de salida). Si le importa mucho IPv6, ése es
 probablemente el primer sitio para empezar.</li>
 <li>¿No le gusta ninguna de éstas? Mire el <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan de desarrollo Tor</a> 
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan de desarrollo Tor</a> 
 para más ideas.</li>
 <li>¿No ve su idea aquí? ¡Probablemente la necesitemos de todas formas! 
 Contáctenos y averígüelo.</li>

Modified: website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fi/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@
 
 <li>
 There's a skeletal <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">list of items
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">list of items
 we'd like to tackle in the future</a>. Alas, many of those items need
 to be fleshed out more before they'll make sense to people who aren't
 Tor developers, but you can still get a general sense of what issues
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">video</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">slides</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html">abstract</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
 and Roger's "Current events in 2007" talk from 24C3 in December
 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4">video</a>,
@@ -175,12 +175,12 @@
 <ul>
 <li>The <b>design document</b> (published at Usenix Security 2004)
 gives our justifications and security analysis for the Tor design:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> and
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> and
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 versions available.</li>
 <li>Our follow-up paper on <b>challenges in low-latency anonymity</b>
 (still in draft form) details more recent experiences and directions:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 draft</a>.</li>
 <li>Our paper at WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> &mdash; explains why usability in
@@ -189,8 +189,8 @@
 <li>Our preliminary design to make it harder for large firewalls to
 prevent access to the Tor network is described in
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a> and
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">HTML draft</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a> and
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">HTML draft</a>.
 Want to <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">help us build it</a>?</li>
 <li>The <b>specifications</b> aim to give
 developers enough information to build a compatible version of Tor:

Modified: website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
 seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 <br />
@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@
 <b>Bring up new ideas!</b>
 <br />
 Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">Tor development
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">Tor development
 roadmap</a> for more ideas.
 </li>
 

Modified: website/trunk/fr/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fr/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fr/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@
 <b>Authentification</b>: Chaque noeud Tor a une clef de déchiffrement
 publique appelée "clef oignon".  Lorsque le client met en place des
 circuits, à chaque étape il <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demande que
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">demande que
 le noeud Tor prouve la connaissance de sa propre clef oignon</a>. Ainsi, le
 premier noeud du circuit ne peut usurper le reste du circuit.  Chaque noeud
 change de clef oignon une fois par semaine.
@@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@
 que tous les utilisateurs Tor connaissent l'intégralité des noeuds Tor). Les
 changement à ce niveau peuvent avoir des conséquences sur
 l'anonymat. Consultez la section 4 de notre article sur <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">nos défis</a> pour plus
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">nos défis</a> pour plus
 détails. Encore une fois, le transport par UDP devrait améliorer grandement
 la situation.
 </p>

Modified: website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fr/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
 <p>
 Il existe d'autres documentations plus complètes sur le protocole de service
 caché que celle-ci. Consultez le <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">document de spécification de
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">document de spécification de
 Tor</a> pour une description plus approfondie ainsi que la <a
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">spécification rendez-vous</a> pour le
 format de messages. 

Modified: website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/fr/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
 <i>Medium to High</i> <br /> Effort Level: <i>Medium</i> <br /> Skill Level:
 <i>High</i> <br /> Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i> <br /> The Tor
 0.2.1.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant improvements</a>
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant improvements</a>
 in resisting national and organizational censorship.  But Tor still needs
 better mechanisms for some parts of its anti-censorship design.  For
 example, current Tors can only listen on a single address/port combination
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@
 href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a> just by
 trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and seeing if they
 respond.  To solve this, bridges could <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools, and
 not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.  To
 start, check out Shane Pope's <a
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@
 et peut-être de refondre quelquechose si les résultats s'avèrent bons.</li>
 <li>Nos objectifs de résistance à la censure incluent l'impossibilité pour un
 attaquant qui observe le trafic Tor de <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">le
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">le
 distinguer d'un trafic SSL normal</a>. Néanmoins, nous ne pouvons pas
 recréer une stéganographie parfaire tout en restant utilisable mais, dans un
 premier temps, nous aimerions pouvoir bloquer toute attaque qui pourrait

Modified: website/trunk/it/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">video</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">slide</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html">abstract</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
 e la presentazione "Current events in 2007" sempre di Roger al 24C3 nel Dicembre
 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4">video</a>,
@@ -185,12 +185,12 @@
 <li>I <b>documenti di design</b> (pubblicati alla Usenix Security 2004)
 forniscono i fondamenti e le analisi di sicurezza di Tor:
 in versione
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.
 </li>
 <li>Il nostro studio successivo sulle <b>sfide nell'anonimato a bassa latenza</b>
 (ancora in versione di bozza) descrive nel dettaglio esperienze e direzioni di sviluppo recenti:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">bozza
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">bozza
 PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Il nostro paper al WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> &mdash; spiega perch&eacute; l'usabilit&agrave; nei
@@ -199,8 +199,8 @@
 <li>Il nostro progetto preliminare per impedire ai firewall di
 bloccare l'accesso alla rete Tor &egrave; descritto in
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">bozza PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">bozza HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">bozza PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">bozza HTML</a>.
 Vedi anche le <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">diapositive</a> e il<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">video</a>

Modified: website/trunk/it/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@
 <b>Autenticazione</b>:
 Ogni relay Tor ha una chiave pubblica di decifratura detta "onion key".
 Quanto il client Tor stabilisce dei circuiti, ad ogni passaggio <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">richiede
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">richiede
 che il relay Tor dimostri di conoscere la sua onion key</a>. In questo modo
 il primo nodo del percorso non pu&ograve; semplicemente falsificare il resto del percorso.
 Ogni relay ruota la sua onion key ogni settimana.
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@
 Tor) sia della directory (smettere di obbligare tutti gli utenti Tor
 a sapere quali sono tutti i relay Tor). Simili cabiamenti potrebbero avere
 un impatto enorme sull'anonimato potenziale e reale. Vedi la sezione 5 del paper <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a>
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Challenges</a>
 per maggiori informazioni. Ancora, il trasporto UDP potrebbe essere molto utile qui.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
 <p>
 Ci sono descrizioni del protocollo hidden service pi&ugrave; approfondite 
 di questa. Vedi il
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
 per una descrizione dettagliata e la
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">rendezvous specification</a>
 per il formato dei messaggi.

Modified: website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/it/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">significant
 improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
 But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
 anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
 just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
 seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
 webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
 and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
 <br />
@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@
 se i risultati fossero soddisfacenti.</li>
 <li>Uno degli obiettivi per resistere alla censura &egrave; impedire
 ad un attaccante che osservi il traffico Tor su una connessione di <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguerlo
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">distinguerlo
 dal normale traffico SSL</a>. Non possiamo ovviamente ottenere perfetta
 steganografia e al contempo essere ancora utilizzabili, ma come primo passo ci
 bloccare tutti quegli attacchi che funzionano solo osservando pochi pacchetti. Uno degli

Modified: website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/ja/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">ビデオ</a>、
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">スライド</a>、
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html">要約</a>、
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">設計文書</a>)、
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">設計文書</a>)、
 そして2007年12月の24C3からRogerの"Current events in 2007"トーク
 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4">ビデオ</a>,
@@ -192,12 +192,12 @@
 <ul>
 <li><b>設計ドキュメント</b> (Usenix Security 2004で公開)
 Torの設計の存在意義とセキュリティ分析について示唆を与えてくれます:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a>または
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a>または
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 で閲覧可能です。</li>
 <li>è¿½åŠ æ–‡æ›¸ã®<b>低レイテンシ匿名化の課題</b>
 (まだドラフト形式)は最新の経験と傾向について掘り下げています:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 ドラフト</a>.</li>
 
 <li>
@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@
 <li>大きなファイアーウォールがTorネットワークへのアクセスを
 邪魔しにくくするため、私達が採用した暫定的なデザインについては
 <b>抗ブロッキング匿名化システムのデザイン</b>で述べられています:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF ドラフト</a> および
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">HTML ドラフト</a>。
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF ドラフト</a> および
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">HTML ドラフト</a>。
 <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">ビルドを手伝
 </a>ってくれませんか？</li>
 <li><b>仕様</b>は、開発者が互換性のあるTorのバージョンを制作するのに十分な

Modified: website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/ja/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 Tor 0.2.0.xシリーズは国家や組織による検閲に対して抵抗力に関して
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">著しい進歩</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">著しい進歩</a>
 を遂げています。しかし、Torは依然としてその反検閲の設計のいくつかの
 部分についてよりよいメカニズムを必要としています。例えば、
 現在のTorは同時に単一のアドレス/ポートをリッスンすることしか
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Torブリッジ</a>
 を識別することができます。この問題を解決するには、ブリッジはポートスキャニング
 ツールでコンタクトされたときには
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">ウェブサーバの
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">ウェブサーバの
 ように振る舞い</a>(HTTPまたはHTTPSで)、ユーザがブリッジ固有の鍵を与えない限り
 ブリッジとして振る舞うことがないようにすることが考えられます。
 <br />
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@
 より徹底した調査をすることになるでしょう。</li>
 <li>私たちの抗検閲の目標の一つとして、回線上のTorの通信を観察している
 攻撃者が<a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
 Torの通信を通常のSSLの通信と区別する</a>
 ことを妨げることが挙げられます。明らかに私たちは完全で依然利用可能な
 ステガノグラフィをを得ることは出来ませんが、始めの一歩として数個の

Modified: website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/nl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@
 <ul>
 <li>Het <b>ontwerpdocument</b> gepubliceerd op het Usenix Security 2004
 symposium geeft de onderbouwing en veiligheidsanalyse voor het Tor concept: 
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> en
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> en
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 versies beschikbaar.</li>
 <li>Ons opvolgende werkdocument over <b>uitdagingen in laag-latente anonimiteit</b>
 zet onze recente ervaringen en richtingen uiteen:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 werkdocument</a>.</li>
 <li>Ons artikel op de WEIS 2006 getiteld <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> legt uit hoe de bruikbaarheid van
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@
 <li>Ons voorlopig ontwerp, om het grote firewalls moeilijker te maken 
 de toegang tot het Tor network te blokkeren, wordt beschreven in
 <b>Design of a Blocking-Resistant Anonymity System</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF werkdocument</a> en
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">HTML werkdocument</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF werkdocument</a> en
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">HTML werkdocument</a>.
 U kunt ook de <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">dia's</a> en <a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">videoclip</a>

Modified: website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/nl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
 eerste plaats om te beginnen.</li>
 
 <li>Geen van alle naar uw zin? Kijk naar de <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan voor verdere
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/roadmap-2007.pdf">plan voor verdere
 ontwikkeling van Tor</a> voor meer ideeën.</li>
 <li>Uw idee hier niet gevonden? Tien tegen één dat we het toch nodig hebben! Neem
 contact met ons op.</li>

Modified: website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">wideo</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">slajdy</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html">abstrakt</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">dokument projektowy</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">dokument projektowy</a>),
 lub przemówienie "Bieżące wydarzenia w roku 2007" Rogera z 24C3 w grudniu
 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4">wideo</a>,
@@ -189,11 +189,11 @@
 <ul>
 <li><b>Dokumenty Projektu</b> (opublikowane na Usenix Security 2004)
  podaje nasze uzasadnienia i analizy bezpieczeństwa projektu Tora: są wersje
- <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> i
- <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> i
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
 <li>Nasz dodatkowy dokument na temat <b>wyzwań w krótkoczasowej anonimowości</b>
  (ciągle w postaci szkicu) podaje szczegóły nowszych doświadczeń i kierunki:
- <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">szkic
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">szkic
  PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Nasz dokument z WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonimowość uwielbia towarzystwo:
   użyteczność i efekt sieci</b> &mdash; tłumaczy, dlaczego użyteczność w
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@
 <li>Nasz wstępny projekt jak utrudnić wielkim zaporom ogniowym (firewallom)
  zapobieganie dostępowi do sieci Tor jest opisany w
   <b>projekcie systemu anonimowości odpornego na blokowanie</b>:
-  <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">szkic PDF</a> i
-  <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">szkic HTML</a>.
+  <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">szkic PDF</a> i
+  <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">szkic HTML</a>.
   Chcesz <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">pomóc nam to stworzyć</a>?</li>
 <li><b>Specyfikacje</b> mają za zadanie dać
  deweloperom dość informacji, by stworzyć kompatybilną wersję Tora:

Modified: website/trunk/pl/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/faq.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/faq.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@
 <b>Uwierzytelnianie</b>: Każdy przekaźnik sieci Tora ma publiczny klucz
 deszyfrujÄ…cy zwany "kluczem cebulowym". Gdy klient Tora uruchamia obwody, na
 każdym kroku <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">żąda, by
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html#subsec:circuits">żąda, by
 przekaźnik sieci udowodnił znajomość swojego klucza cebulowego</a>. Tym
 sposobem, pierwszy węzeł w ścieżce nie może podszyć się pod resztę
 ścieżki. Każdy przekaźnik zmienia swój klucz raz w tygodniu.
@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@
 przestać wymagać, by wszyscy użytkownicy Tora wiedzieli o wszystkich
 przekaźnikach). Takie zmiany mogą mieć wielki wpływ na potencjalną i
 rzeczywistą anonimowość. Przeczytaj sekcję 5 dokumentu <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">Wyzwania</a>, by poznać
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">Wyzwania</a>, by poznać
 szczegóły. Ponownie, transport UDP by tu pomógł.
 </p>
 

Modified: website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
 
 <p>
 Istnieją bardziej szczegółowe opisy protokołu usług ukrytych niż ta strona.
-Przeczytaj <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">dokument projektowy Tora</a>
+Przeczytaj <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">dokument projektowy Tora</a>
 zawierający dogłębny opis projektu, oraz
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">specyfikację spotkań (rendezvous)</a>,
 zawierającą formaty wiadomości.

Modified: website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pl/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@
 Prawdopodobni opiekunowie: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
 <br />
 Wersje 0.2.1.x Tora robiÄ… <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">znaczne postępy</a> w opieraniu
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">znaczne postępy</a> w opieraniu
 się narodowej i firmowej cenzurze. Ale Tor ciągle potrzebuje lepszych mechanizmów w
 niektórych częściach projektu anty-cenzurowania. Na przykład, bieżące wersje mogą
 nasłuchiwać połączeń tylko na jednym zestawie adres/port na raz. Istnieje
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
 <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">mostki Tora</a>
 po prostu łącząc się z nimi, zgodnie z protokołem Tora, i sprawdzając,
 czy odpowiadają. By rozwiązać ten problem, mostki mogłyby
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">udawać serwery
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">udawać serwery
 internetowe</a> (HTTP lub HTTPS), gdy łączą się z nimi programy do skanowania portów,
 a nie zachowywać się jak mostki do chwili, gdy użytkownik poda klucz specyficzny
 dla mostka.
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@
 
 <li>Nasze cele w opieraniu siÄ™ cenzurze to m.in. zapobieganie temu, by napastnik
 podglądający ruch Tora mógł <a
-href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint"
+href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint"
 >odróżnić go od normalnego ruchu SSL</a>. Oczywiście, nie możemy osiągnąć idealnej
 steganografii i dalej mieć użyteczną i działającą sieć, ale w pierwszym kroku
 chcielibyśmy blokować jakiekolwiek ataki, które mogą się udać po obserwacji tylko

Modified: website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/pt/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">vídeo</a>,
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">slides</a>,
 <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1444.en.html">abstract</a>,
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">design paper</a>),
 e a palestra "Current events in 2007" de Roger, no 24C3 em dezembro
 de 2007 (<a
 href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/24c3-2325-en-current_events_in_tor_development.mp4">vídeo</a>,
@@ -182,12 +182,12 @@
 <li>O <b>documento de design</b> (publicado na Usenix Security 2004)
 tem as nossas justificativas e análise de segurança para o design do Tor:
 estão disponíveis versões em 
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>.</li>
 <li>Nosso paper seguinte sobre <b>challenges in low-latency anonymity</b>
 ("desafios em anonimato de baixa latência" - ainda em rascunho) detalha as
 experiências e diretrizes mais recentes:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a>.</li>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a>.</li>
 <li>Nosso paper da WEIS 2006 &mdash; <b>Anonymity Loves Company:
 Usability and the Network Effect</b> (Anonimato Adora Companhia: Usabilidade e o
 Efeito Rede) &mdash; explica porque a usabilidade em sistemas de anonimato 
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@
 <li>Nosso design preliminar para dificultar o bloqueio de acesso à rede Tor por 
 grandes firewalls está descrito em 
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a> e
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">rascunho em HTML</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">rascunho em PDF</a> e
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">rascunho em HTML</a>.
 Quer nos <a href="<page volunteer>#Coding">ajudar a construí-lo</a>?</li>
 <li>As <b>especificações</b> têm como objetivo dar aos desenvolvedores informação
 suficiente para construir uma versão compatível do Tor:

Modified: website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/ru/hidden-services.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@
 
 <p>
 Существуют более подробные описания протокола скрытых сервисов. Обратите
-внимание на <a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Документ об
+внимание на <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Документ об
 архитектуре сети Tor</a> для получения более углубленной информации об
 архитектуре и <a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/rend-spec.txt">спецификациях точек
 синхронизации</a> для форматов сообщений.

Modified: website/trunk/se/documentation.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/se/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/se/documentation.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -79,18 +79,18 @@
 <ul>
 <li><b>Design dokument</b> (publiserat p&aring; Usenix Security 2004)
 anger v&aring;ra sk&auml;l och s&auml;kerhetsanalys av Tors design:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> och
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">PDF</a> och
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.html">HTML</a>
 version finns.</li>
 <li>V&aring;r uppf&ouml;ljande artikel ang&aring;ende <b>utmaningar i l&aring;gf&ouml;rdr&ouml;jningsanonymitet</b>
 (fortfarande i utkast-format) anger i detalj de senaste erfarenheterna och inriktingar:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/challenges.pdf">PDF
 version</a>.</li>
 
 <li>En preliminär desing för att göre det svårare för stora brandväggar att
 hindra tillgång till Tor-nätverket finns beskrivet i
 <b>design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system</b>:
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a>.
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.pdf">PDF draft</a>.
 Se också <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-23c3.pdf">bilder</a> och
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/~arma/23C3-1444-en-tor_and_china.m4v">video</a>
 från Rogers <a href="http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Home">23C3 föredrag</a>.

Modified: website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 15:02:01 UTC (rev 22047)
+++ website/trunk/zh-cn/volunteer.wml	2010-03-25 16:12:54 UTC (rev 22048)
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
 Skill Level: <i>High</i>
 <br />
 Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Steven</i>
-Tor 0.2.0.x系列的<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">一个重要改进</a
+Tor 0.2.0.x系列的<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html">一个重要改进</a
 >是提高了抵抗政府机关或者组织探测的能力。但是 Tor 的反审查设计在某些方面仍然需要
 更好的机制来改进。比如，现在 Tor 只能在一个 地址/端口  对上进行监听，
 有<a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">建议放开这个限制</a>，
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@
 的扫描者可以通过尝试连接一个假定的 Tor 主机，向其发送 Tor 协议包，并检查它的响应来确定
 它是否在运行<a href="<gitblob>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt"> Tor 网桥</a>。
 要解决这个问题，当受到端口扫描工具扫描的时候，网桥应该
-<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">伪装成一个 web 服务器</a>
+<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">伪装成一个 web 服务器</a>
 （HTTP或者HTTPS），如果对方没有提供正确的网桥 key，那么它不会作出正确的网桥连接响应。
 <br />
 è¿™éƒ¨åˆ†çš„å·¥ä½œéœ€è¦å¤§é‡çš„ç ”ç©¶å’Œè®¾è®¡ã€‚ä¸€ä¸ªå·¨å¤§çš„æŒ‘æˆ˜æ˜¯ï¼Œå³ä½¿ä¸€ä¸ªæ”»å‡»è€…çŸ¥é“æˆ‘ä»¬çš„ç®—æ³•å’Œæœºåˆ¶ï¼Œ
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@
 </li>
 
 <!-- NEED HELP -->
-<li>æˆ‘ä»¬åå®¡æŸ¥æœºåˆ¶çš„ç›®æ ‡åŒ…æ‹¬é˜²æ­¢æ”»å‡»è€…<a href="<gitblob>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
+<li>æˆ‘ä»¬åå®¡æŸ¥æœºåˆ¶çš„ç›®æ ‡åŒ…æ‹¬é˜²æ­¢æ”»å‡»è€…<a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint">
 从普通 SSL ä¼ è¾“ä¸­åŒºåˆ† Tor 数据包</a>。很明显，我们不可能既做到完美的隐藏又保持可用性，但是，
 é¦–å…ˆï¼Œæˆ‘ä»¬å¸Œæœ›èƒ½å¤Ÿé˜»æ­¢æ”»å‡»è€…ä»…ä»…è§‚å¯Ÿå‡ ä¸ªæ•°æ®åŒ…å°±å¯ä»¥å–å¾—æˆåŠŸã€‚åœ¨è¿™äº›æ”»å‡»ä¸­ï¼Œæœ‰ä¸€ä¸ªæˆ‘ä»¬æ²¡æœ‰è¿›è¡Œå¤ªå¤šæµ‹è¯•çš„
 问题是，Tor 的数据包是以512å­—èŠ‚ä¸ºå•ä½çš„ï¼Œå› æ­¤ï¼Œä¼ è¾“çš„æ•°æ®åŒ…å¯ä»¥æ˜¯512字节的倍数。在物理线路上，