[or-cvs] r22241: {projects} clean up the general presentations. (projects/presentations)
Andrew Lewman
andrew at torproject.org
Mon Apr 26 02:12:57 UTC 2010
Author: phobos
Date: 2010-04-26 02:12:57 +0000 (Mon, 26 Apr 2010)
New Revision: 22241
Modified:
projects/presentations/Anonymity-Online-Presentation.tex
projects/presentations/Censorship-HighLevel-Presentation.tex
Log:
clean up the general presentations.
Modified: projects/presentations/Anonymity-Online-Presentation.tex
===================================================================
--- projects/presentations/Anonymity-Online-Presentation.tex 2010-04-26 01:49:43 UTC (rev 22240)
+++ projects/presentations/Anonymity-Online-Presentation.tex 2010-04-26 02:12:57 UTC (rev 22241)
@@ -11,56 +11,210 @@
\maketitle
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
-\hspace{1cm}
-\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/chacha}
\end{center}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{George Orwell was an optimist}
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present controls the past
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty Four, 1949
+\frametitle{What is anonymity?}
+\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/2llg3ts}
+\end{frame}
-\flushleft
-The re-writing of history is now much more efficient than when George Orwell imagined armies of Winston Smiths cutting holes in newspaper archives
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Anonymity isn't cryptography}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Cryptography protects the contents in transit
+\item You still know who is talking to whom, how often, and how much data is sent.
+\end{itemize}
+\begin{center}
+\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/encryption-cc-by-sa}
+\end{center}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Internet architecture allows surveillance}
-\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/cnmap}
-\flushright
-\tiny Diagram: China Internet Network Information Center
+\frametitle{Anonymity isn't steganography}
+Attacker can tell Alice is talking to someone, how often, and how much data is sent.
+\bigskip
+
+\begin{center}
+\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/steganography-cc-by-sa}
+\end{center}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Sweden's iPRED experience}
-\includegraphics[scale=1]{./images/netnodnov}
+\frametitle{Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item "You can't prove it was me!"
+\pause \item "Promise you won't look"
+\pause \item "Promise you won't remember"
+\pause \item "Promise you won't tell"
+\pause \item "I didn't write my name on it!"
+\pause \item "Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"
+\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Incentives}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Our analysis shows that consumers increasingly want to decide for themselves when to watch and from which screen. Unfortunately, many have become adept at circumventing the IPRED legislation.
-\flushright --- Jens Heron, Mediavision
+\frametitle{..since "weak" isn't anonymity.}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item \textit{"You can't prove it was me!"} Proof is a very \textbf{strong} word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty.
+\pause \item \textit{"Promise you won't look/remember/tell"} Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises?
+\pause \item \textit{"I didn't write my name on it!"} Not what we're talking about.
+\pause \item \textit{"Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"} Nope!
+\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Resisting Internet censorship}
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- John Gilmore, 1993
+\frametitle{Anonymous communication}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company")
+\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd
+\item Hide who is communicating with whom
+\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
-\flushleft
-No longer true on a technical level: censorship is in the routers.
-\medskip
-Remains true on a social level: when material is censored, people distribute copies and draw attention to them
-\medskip
-But what if people are too afraid to do this?
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Low versus High-latency anonymous communication systems}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Tor is not the first system; ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop proxies, Crowds, Java Anon Proxy.
+\item Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks.
+\item High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, less interactive.
+\end{itemize}
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today's user}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users)
+\item Multi-hour delays: email, nntp, blog posting? (tens of thousands of users?)
+\pause \item \begin{center}\begin{Large}And if anonymity loves company...\end{Large}\end{center}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Who wants anonymity online?}
+\parbox{8cm}{\sloppy \setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{./images/anonymousman}}
+\parbox{3cm}{\sloppy
+\begin{itemize}
+\begin{small}
+\item Normal people
+\item Law Enforcement
+\item Human Rights Activists
+\item Business Execs
+\item Militaries
+\item Abuse Victims
+\end{small}
+\end{itemize}
+}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{What is Tor?}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item online anonymity, circumvention software and network
+\item open source, free software (BSD 3-clause \& GPLv2 licenses)
+\pause \item active research environment: \\
+Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston U, Harvard, MIT, RPI, GaTech
+\pause \item increasingly diverse toolset: \\
+Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TorVM, Incognito LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, TorFox, Torora, Portable Tor, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, Tor Wall
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Who is The Tor Project, Inc?}
+\begin{columns}[c]
+\column{5cm}
+\includegraphics[height=4.5cm]{./images/2009-oval_sticker_new}
+\column{5cm}
+The 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of tools for online anonymity and privacy
+\end{columns}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Tor is a low-latency anonymity system}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item<1-> Based on technology developed in the Onion Routing project
+\item<2-> Privacy by design, not by policy (no data collected)
+\item<3-> Commonly used for web browsing and instant messaging (works for any TCP traffic)
+\item<4-> Originally built as a pure anonymity system (hides who is talking to whom)
+\item<5-> Now designed to resist censorship too (hides whether someone is using the system at all)
+\end{itemize}
+
+\begin{center}
+\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
+\end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Tor code stats}
+\includegraphics[width=10.5cm]{./images/ohloh-lines-of-code-by-language}
+\flushright \tiny stats from http://www.ohloh.net/p/tor
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{How many people use Tor?}
+No idea. It's an anonymity system. \\[1cm]
+\pause http://metrics.torproject.org/ for an idea.
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{estimated 500,000 daily users}
+\setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{./images/huge-crowd}]
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{No really, how many people use Tor?}
+\begin{flushleft}
+\includegraphics[width=12cm]{./images/2009-12-16-mozilla-stats}
+\end{flushleft}
+\end{frame}
+
+
+\begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers}
+ \begin{center}
+ \begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
+ \only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}}
+ \only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}}
+ \only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}}
+ \end{overlayarea}
+ \flushright
+ \tiny Diagram: Robert Watson
+ \end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow censorship resistant services}
+\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/wikileaks}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?}
+\\[1cm]
+\begin{center}
+\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}}
+\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}}
+\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}}
+\end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{How to get involved}
+\begin{center}
+\begin{huge}https://torproject.org/volunteer\end{huge}
+\end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Limitations of anonymous communication}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item There is something for everyone to like, and something for everyone to dislike, going on with online anonymity systems
+\item Bad people do use them to do bad things (for many different definitions of bad people)
+\item It is impossible to block bad uses, even if we could come up with a common definition of bad content
+\item The systems are not perfect, so it is possible some people will be caught
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Freedom of speech and anonymity}
\textbf{United States Constitution: 1st Amendment}
@@ -89,6 +243,13 @@
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Internet architecture allows surveillance}
+\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/cnmap}
+\flushright
+\tiny Diagram: China Internet Network Information Center
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Internet surveillance is pervasive}
\begin{columns}[t]
\column{7cm}
@@ -96,7 +257,7 @@
\item Conventional surveillance methods had to be targeted
\item Internet censorship is capable of monitoring everyone, all of the time
\item Governments are increasing monitoring: SORM (Russia), Golden Shield (China), Data Retention Directive (EU), and Interception Modernisation Programme (UK), Warrantless Wiretapping (USA)
-\item 1 in 7 East German citizens worked for the Stasi. Today we can achieve the same results with a fraction of the cost
+\item 1 in 7 East German citizens worked for the Stasi. Today we can achieve the same results for a fraction of the cost.
\end{itemize}
\column{5cm}
\vbox{}
@@ -155,103 +316,6 @@
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Who wants online privacy?}
-\begin{columns}[t]
-\begin{column}{5cm}
-\begin{overprint}
-\includegraphics[scale=0.38]{./images/cropped-anon-man}
-\end{overprint}
-\vspace{3cm}
-\end{column}
-\begin{column}{5cm}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Ordinary people
-\item Military and Law Enforcement
-\item Journalists
-\item Human rights workers
-\item Businesses
-\end{itemize}
-\end{column}
-\end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Anonymous communication}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company")
-\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd
-\item Hide who is communicating with whom
-\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Tor is a low-latency anonymity system}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item<1-> Based on technology developed in the Onion Routing project
-\item<2-> Privacy by design, not by policy (no data collected)
-\item<3-> Commonly used for web browsing and instant messaging (works for any TCP traffic)
-\item<4-> Originally built as a pure anonymity system (hides who is talking to whom)
-\item<5-> Now designed to resist censorship too (hides whether someone is using the system at all)
-\end{itemize}
-
-\begin{center}
-\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
-\end{center}
-
-\end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers}
- \begin{center}
- \begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
- \only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}}
- \only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}}
- \only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}}
- \end{overlayarea}
- \flushright
-
- \tiny Diagram: Robert Watson
- \end{center}
- \end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow censorship resistant services}
-\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/wikileaks}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?}
-\\[1cm]
-\begin{center}
-\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}}
-\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}}
-\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}}
-\end{center}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Limitations of anonymous communication}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item There is something for everyone to like, and something for everyone to dislike, going on with online anonymity systems
-\item Bad people do use them to do bad things (for many different definitions of bad people)
-\item It is impossible to block bad uses, even if we could come up with a common definition of bad content
-\item The systems are not perfect, so it is possible some people will be caught
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Conclusions}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item The Internet and centralisation can both improve and harm freedom of speech
-\item Slogans regarding the borderless nature and inherent freedoms of the Internet are frequently wrong
-\item Technical details matter: how a system is implemented can make a radical difference
-\item Technologies are tools, they can be used for good and bad
-\item However, policies must be changed too and pressure is needed on legislators
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
\frametitle{One Version of the Future}
\begin{quotation}
\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad
@@ -271,6 +335,17 @@
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Conclusions}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item The Internet and centralisation can both improve and harm freedom of speech
+\item Slogans regarding the borderless nature and inherent freedoms of the Internet are frequently wrong
+\item Technical details matter: how a system is implemented can make a radical difference
+\item Technologies are tools, they can be used for good and bad
+\item However, policies must be changed too and pressure is needed on legislators
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Credits}
\begin{itemize}
\item Thank you to Steven J. Murdoch, \url{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/}, for the research and basis for this presentation. \\
Modified: projects/presentations/Censorship-HighLevel-Presentation.tex
===================================================================
--- projects/presentations/Censorship-HighLevel-Presentation.tex 2010-04-26 01:49:43 UTC (rev 22240)
+++ projects/presentations/Censorship-HighLevel-Presentation.tex 2010-04-26 02:12:57 UTC (rev 22241)
@@ -158,6 +158,17 @@
\end{frame}
\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Sweden's iPRED experience}
+\includegraphics[scale=1]{./images/netnodnov}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Incentives}
+\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Our analysis shows that consumers increasingly want to decide for themselves when to watch and from which screen. Unfortunately, many have become adept at circumventing the IPRED legislation.
+\flushright --- Jens Heron, Mediavision
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
\frametitle{Resisting Internet censorship}
\begin{quotation}
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