[or-cvs] [tor/master] Dir auths reject relays running < Tor 0.1.2.14
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Wed Sep 30 22:44:47 UTC 2009
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2009 18:34:21 -0400
Subject: Dir auths reject relays running < Tor 0.1.2.14
Commit: 53a7636a0527d13c83832b115a88b97eda08fa8b
Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than
0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network,
none of which are very big.
---
ChangeLog | 7 +++++--
src/or/dirserv.c | 8 ++++----
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 05e4373..ecf80b4 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Changes in version 0.2.2.4-alpha - 2009-??-??
o Major bugfixes:
- Fix another assert in the circuit_build_times code that causes Tor
- to fail to start once we have accumulated 5000 build times in the
- state file. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes bug 1108.
+ to fail to start once we have accumulated 5000 build times in the
+ state file. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes bug 1108.
o Minor features:
- Log SSL state transitions at debug level during handshake, and
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.4-alpha - 2009-??-??
during the TLS handshake.
- Revert to the "June 3 2009" ip-to-country file. The September one
seems to have removed most US IP addresses.
+ - Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than
+ 0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network,
+ none of which are very big.
o Code simplifications and refactoring:
- Revise our unit tests to use the "tinytest" framework, so we
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 1f4049b..5deb0ea 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -371,10 +371,10 @@ dirserv_get_status_impl(const char *id_digest, const char *nickname,
strmap_size(fingerprint_list->fp_by_name),
digestmap_size(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest));
- /* 0.1.1.17-rc was the first version that claimed to be stable, doesn't
- * crash and drop circuits all the time, and is even vaguely compatible with
- * the current network */
- if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.1.1.17-rc")) {
+ /* Tor 0.1.2.x is pretty old, but there are a lot of them running still,
+ * and there aren't any critical relay-side vulnerabilities. Once more
+ * of them die off, we should raise this minimum to 0.2.0.x. */
+ if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.1.2.14")) {
if (msg)
*msg = "Tor version is far too old to work.";
return FP_REJECT;
--
1.5.6.5
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