[or-cvs] [tor/master] stop capping bandwidths we see in the consensus
Nick Mathewson
nickm at seul.org
Tue Jun 30 14:14:56 UTC 2009
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2009 10:55:08 -0400
Subject: stop capping bandwidths we see in the consensus
Commit: 9fc3d8782776d6feff8fb6e239a66cc3c0f26d37
but continue capping bandwidths we see in local server
descriptors, if we have no consensus weights for them.
---
ChangeLog | 2 ++
src/or/routerlist.c | 34 +++++++++-------------------------
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index dba7e36..bce39ce 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.17-?? - 2009-??-??
o Minor bugfixes:
- Serve the DirPortFrontPage page even when we have been approaching
our quotas recently. Fixes bug 1013; bugfix on 0.2.1.8-alpha.
+ - Do not cap bandwidths reported by directory authorities; they are
+ already adjusted to reflect reality.
o Major features:
- Clients now use the bandwidth values in the consensus, rather than
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 1419ae4..392b07b 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -1523,15 +1523,12 @@ router_get_advertised_bandwidth_capped(routerinfo_t *router)
return result;
}
-/** Eventually, the number we return will come from the directory
- * consensus, so clients can dynamically update to better numbers.
- *
- * But for now, or in case there is no consensus available, just return
- * a sufficient default. */
-static uint32_t
-get_max_believable_bandwidth(void)
+/** Return bw*1000, unless bw*1000 would overflow, in which case return
+ * INT32_MAX. */
+static INLINE int32_t
+kb_to_bytes(uint32_t bw)
{
- return DEFAULT_MAX_BELIEVABLE_BANDWIDTH;
+ return (bw > (INT32_MAX/1000)) ? INT32_MAX : bw*1000;
}
/** Helper function:
@@ -1568,7 +1565,6 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule,
int n_unknown = 0;
bitarray_t *exit_bits;
bitarray_t *guard_bits;
- uint32_t max_believable_bw = get_max_believable_bandwidth();
int me_idx = -1;
/* Can't choose exit and guard at same time */
@@ -1598,7 +1594,7 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule,
is_exit = status->is_exit;
is_guard = status->is_possible_guard;
if (status->has_bandwidth) {
- this_bw = status->bandwidth*1000;
+ this_bw = kb_to_bytes(status->bandwidth);
} else { /* guess */
/* XXX022 once consensuses always list bandwidths, we can take
* this guessing business out. -RD */
@@ -1617,7 +1613,7 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule,
is_exit = router->is_exit;
is_guard = router->is_possible_guard;
if (rs && rs->has_bandwidth) {
- this_bw = rs->bandwidth*1000;
+ this_bw = kb_to_bytes(rs->bandwidth);
} else if (rs) { /* guess; don't trust the descriptor */
/* XXX022 once consensuses always list bandwidths, we can take
* this guessing business out. -RD */
@@ -1626,27 +1622,15 @@ smartlist_choose_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl, bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule,
flags |= is_exit ? 2 : 0;
flags |= is_guard ? 4 : 0;
} else /* bridge or other descriptor not in our consensus */
- this_bw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth(router);
+ this_bw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth_capped(router);
}
if (is_exit)
bitarray_set(exit_bits, i);
if (is_guard)
bitarray_set(guard_bits, i);
- /* if they claim something huge, don't believe it */
- if (this_bw > max_believable_bw) {
- char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
- base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp), statuses ?
- status->identity_digest :
- router->cache_info.identity_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIR,
- "Bandwidth %d for router %s (%s) exceeds allowed max %d, capping",
- this_bw, router ? router->nickname : "(null)",
- fp, max_believable_bw);
- this_bw = max_believable_bw;
- }
if (is_known) {
bandwidths[i] = (int32_t) this_bw; // safe since MAX_BELIEVABLE<INT32_MAX
+ tor_assert(bandwidths[i] >= 0);
if (is_guard)
total_guard_bw += this_bw;
else
--
1.5.6.5
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