[or-cvs] r14607: * New upstream version. * Conflict with old libssls. * On up (tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian)

weasel at seul.org weasel at seul.org
Tue May 13 17:03:44 UTC 2008 

Author: weasel
Date: 2008-05-13 13:03:44 -0400 (Tue, 13 May 2008)
New Revision: 14607

Added:
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.NEWS
Modified:
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/changelog
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/control
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.postinst
Log:
* New upstream version.
* Conflict with old libssls.
* On upgrading from versions prior to, including, 0.1.2.19-2, or
  from versions later than 0.2.0 and prior to 0.2.0.26-rc do the
  following, and if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys
  directory)
  - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way.
  - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way.
  - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was
    created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad
    libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable.
* Add a NEWS file explaining this change.


Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/changelog
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/changelog	2008-05-13 16:59:27 UTC (rev 14606)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/changelog	2008-05-13 17:03:44 UTC (rev 14607)
@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
+tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * Conflict with old libssls.
+  * On upgrading from versions prior to, including, 0.1.2.19-2, or
+    from versions later than 0.2.0 and prior to 0.2.0.26-rc do the
+    following, and if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys
+    directory)
+    - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way.
+    - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way.
+    - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was
+      created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad
+      libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable.
+  * Add a NEWS file explaining this change.
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel at debian.org>  Tue, 13 May 2008 16:11:21 +0200
+
 tor (0.2.0.24-rc-1) experimental; urgency=low
 
   * New upstream version.

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/control
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/control	2008-05-13 16:59:27 UTC (rev 14606)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/control	2008-05-13 17:03:44 UTC (rev 14607)
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 Package: tor
 Architecture: any
 Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, adduser, tsocks
+Conflicts: libssl0.9.8 (<< 0.9.8g-9)
 Recommends: privoxy | polipo (>= 1), socat, logrotate
 Suggests: mixmaster, mixminion, anon-proxy
 Description: anonymizing overlay network for TCP

Added: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.NEWS
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.NEWS	                        (rev 0)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.NEWS	2008-05-13 17:03:44 UTC (rev 14607)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical
+
+  * weak cryptographic keys
+
+    It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
+    openssl package is predictable.  This is caused by an incorrect
+    Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166).  As a
+    result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
+
+    See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
+    http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
+
+    If you run a Tor server using this package please see
+    /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel at debian.org>  Tue, 13 May 2008 12:49:05 +0200

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.postinst
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.postinst	2008-05-13 16:59:27 UTC (rev 14606)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.postinst	2008-05-13 17:03:44 UTC (rev 14607)
@@ -51,6 +51,71 @@
 find /var/log/tor -type d -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty chmod 02750
 find /var/log/tor -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty chmod 00640
 
+
+move_away_keys=0
+
+if [ "$1" = "configure" ] &&
+   [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys ] &&
+   [ ! -z "$2" ]; then
+	if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.1.2.19-2; then
+		move_away_keys=1
+	elif dpkg --compare-versions "$2" gt 0.2.0 &&
+	     dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.2.0.26-rc; then
+		move_away_keys=1
+	fi
+fi
+if [ "$move_away_keys" = "1" ]; then
+	echo "Retiring possibly compromised keys.  See /usr/share/doc/tor/NEWS.Debian.gz"
+	echo "and /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY for"
+	echo "further information."
+	if ! [ -d /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package ]; then
+		mkdir /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package
+		cat > /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY << EOF
+It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
+openssl package is predictable.  This is caused by an incorrect
+Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166).  As a
+result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
+
+See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
+http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
+
+The Debian package for Tor has moved away the onion keys upon package
+upgrade, and it will have moved away your identity key if it was created
+in the affected timeframe.  There is no sure way to automatically tell
+if your key was created with an affected openssl library, so this move
+is done unconditionally.
+
+If you have restarted Tor since this change (and the package probably
+did that for you already unless you configured your system differently)
+then the Tor daemon already created new keys for itself and in all
+likelyhood is already working just fine with new keys.
+
+If you are absolutely certain that your identity key was created with
+a non-affected version of openssl and for some reason you have to retain
+the old identity, then you can move back the copy of secret_id_key to
+/var/lib/tor/keys.  Do not move back the onion keys, they were created
+only recently since they are temporary keys with a lifetime of only a few
+days anyway.
+
+Sincerely,
+Peter Palfrader, Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:23 +0200
+EOF
+	fi
+	for f in secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old; do
+		if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" ]; then
+			mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/"$f"
+		fi
+	done
+	if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key ]; then
+		id_mtime=`/usr/bin/stat -c %Y /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key`
+		sept=`date -d '2006-09-10' +%s`
+		if [ "$id_mtime" -gt "$sept" ] ; then
+			mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/secret_id_key
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+
+
 #DEBHELPER#
 
 exit 0

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