[or-cvs] r15438: annotate the todo file a bit (tor/trunk/doc)
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Mon Jun 23 20:16:40 UTC 2008
Author: arma
Date: 2008-06-23 16:16:40 -0400 (Mon, 23 Jun 2008)
New Revision: 15438
Modified:
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
Log:
annotate the todo file a bit
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2008-06-23 19:13:20 UTC (rev 15437)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2008-06-23 20:16:40 UTC (rev 15438)
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@
results of the getinfo.
R - get matt to make vidalia do a getinfo status/bootstrap-phase to
get caught up after it connects.
-R - get matt to change vidalia's bootstrap status alerts so it doesn't
+ o get matt to change vidalia's bootstrap status alerts so it doesn't
do anything if the event includes "recommendation=ignore".
o in circuituse.c,
/* XXX021 consider setting n_conn->socket_error to TIMEOUT */
@@ -359,11 +359,11 @@
For 0.2.1.x:
- Proposals to do:
- 110: avoid infinite-length circuits
- - 128: families of private bridges
+R d 128: families of private bridges
- 134: handle authority fragmentation.
- Proposals to write:
- - Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as
+R d Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as
next hop after the bridge?
X Add an 'exit-address' line in the descriptor for servers that exit
from something that isn't their published address.
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@
variable-length cells, proposal-110 stuff, and versioned CREATES?
- Eliminate use of v2 networkstatus documents in v3 authority
decision-making.
- - Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *)
+N . Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *)
- Separate Guard flags for "pick this as a new guard" and "keep this
as an existing guard". First investigate if we want this.
- Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right
@@ -401,9 +401,10 @@
- Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight
their choices even before they have the descriptors; and so
authorities can put in more accurate numbers in the future.
- . Map out the process of bootstrapping, break it into status events,
+R . Map out the process of bootstrapping, break it into status events,
spec those events. Also, map out the ways where we can realize that
bootstrapping is *failing*, and include those. *
+ d Fetch an updated geoip file from the directory authorities.
- Tiny designs to write:
- Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients
@@ -412,6 +413,9 @@
not choose who it connects to.
- Do TLS connection rotation more often than "once a week" in the
extra-stable case.
+ (One reason not to do it more often is because the old TLS conn
+ probably has a circuit on it, and we don't really want to build up
+ dozens of TCP connections to all the other extra-stable relays.)
- If a relay publishes a new descriptor with a significantly lower
uptime or with a new IP address, then we should consider its current
"running" interval to have ended even if it hadn't yet failed its
@@ -419,12 +423,12 @@
appeared, and a new interval began then too.
- Items to backport to 0.2.0.x once solved in 0.2.1.x:
-R - add a geoip file *
-W - figure out license *
+ o add a geoip file *
+ o figure out license *
- Use less RAM *
- Optimize cell pool allocation.
- - Support (or just always use) jemalloc (if it helps)
+ d Support (or just always use) jemalloc (if it helps)
- mmap more files.
- Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
- Use less bandwidth
@@ -528,7 +532,7 @@
I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak.
- Interface for letting SOAT modify flags that authorities assign.
- (How to keep the authority from clobbering them afterwords?
+ (How to keep the authority from clobbering them afterwards?
Later, unless people want to implement them now:
- Actually use SSL_shutdown to close our TLS connections.
@@ -587,7 +591,7 @@
- Consider if we can solve: the Tor client doesn't know what flags
its bridge has (since it only gets the descriptor), so it can't
make decisions based on Fast or Stable.
- - Bridge authorities should do reachability testing but only on the
+ o Bridge authorities should do reachability testing but only on the
purpose==bridge descriptors they have.
- Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached
bridge.
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