[or-cvs] r9260: man page entries for TunnelDirConns and PreferTunneledDirCon (in tor/trunk: . doc src/or)
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Thu Jan 4 04:35:20 UTC 2007
Author: arma
Date: 2007-01-03 23:35:18 -0500 (Wed, 03 Jan 2007)
New Revision: 9260
Modified:
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
tor/trunk/doc/tor.1.in
tor/trunk/src/or/config.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c
tor/trunk/src/or/dirserv.c
Log:
man page entries for TunnelDirConns and PreferTunneledDirConns
and add a todo item for nick in case he gets bored :)
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-01-03 23:58:03 UTC (rev 9259)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-01-04 04:35:18 UTC (rev 9260)
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@
options files.
- Reject *:563 (NTTPS) in the default exit policy. We already reject
NNTP by default, so this seems like a sensible addition.
- - Authorities do not recommend exits as guards if this would shift
- excess load to the exit nodes.
- Avoid some inadvertent info leaks by making clients reject hostnames
with invalid characters. Add an option "AllowNonRFC953Hostnames"
to disable this behavior, in case somebody is running a private
@@ -44,7 +42,7 @@
- Add a new address-spec.txt document to describe our special-case
addresses: .exit, .onion, and .noconnnect.
- Add a maintainer script to tell us which options are missing
- documentation.
+ documentation: "make check-docs".
- Remove some options that have been deprecated since at least 0.1.0.x:
AccountingMaxKB, LogFile, DebugLogFile, LogLevel, and SysLog. Use
AccountingMax instead of AccountingMaxKB; use Log to set log options.
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2007-01-03 23:58:03 UTC (rev 9259)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2007-01-04 04:35:18 UTC (rev 9260)
@@ -59,19 +59,14 @@
o Implement
R - Hunt for places that change networkstatus info that I might have
missed.
-R . option to dl directory info via tor
- o Make an option like __AllDirActionsPrivate that falls back to
- non-Tor DL when not enough info present. (TunnelDirConns).
- - Set default to 0 before release candidate.
- o Think harder about whether TunnelDirConns should be on
- by default. No, they shouldn't, until we have much more of
- blocking.pdf implemented.
- o Handle case where we have no descriptors and so don't know who can
- handle BEGIN_DIR.
- - actually cause the directory.c functions to know about or_port
- and use it when we're supposed to.
- - man page items for TunnelDirConns and PreferTunneledDirConns
+ . option to dl directory info via tor:
+ TunnelDirConns and PreferTunneledDirConns
+R - actually cause the directory.c functions to know about or_port
+ and use it when we're supposed to.
+N - for tunneled edge conns, stop reading to the bridge connection
+ when the or_conn we're writing to has a full outbuf.
+
N - DNS improvements
. Asynchronous DNS
- Make evdns use windows strerror equivalents.
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/tor.1.in
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/tor.1.in 2007-01-03 23:58:03 UTC (rev 9259)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/tor.1.in 2007-01-04 04:35:18 UTC (rev 9260)
@@ -242,10 +242,15 @@
.LP
.TP
\fBTunnelDirConns \fR\fB0|\fR\fB1\fP
-If non-zero, try to have all directory info downloaded with encrypted
-connections. (Default: 1)
+If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will
+build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its
+ORPort. (Default: 0)
+.LP
+.TP
+\fBPreferTunneledDirConns \fR\fB0|\fR\fB1\fP
+If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
+directory connections, when possible. (Default: 0)
-
.SH CLIENT OPTIONS
.PP
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSocksPort\fP is non-zero):
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/config.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/config.c 2007-01-03 23:58:03 UTC (rev 9259)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/config.c 2007-01-04 04:35:18 UTC (rev 9260)
@@ -347,6 +347,8 @@
"provided IP address (only useful for multiple network interfaces)." },
{ "PIDFile", "On startup, write our PID to this file. On clean shutdown, "
"remove the file." },
+ { "PreferTunneledDirConns", "If non-zero, avoid directory servers that "
+ "don't support tunneled conncetions." },
/* PreferTunneledDirConns */
/* ProtocolWarnings */
/* RephistTrackTime */
@@ -354,8 +356,9 @@
"started. Unix only." },
{ "SafeLogging", "If set to 0, Tor logs potentially sensitive strings "
"rather than replacing them with the string [scrubbed]." },
- { "TunnelDirConns", "If non-zero, try to have all directory info downloaded "
- "via encrypted connections." },
+ { "TunnelDirConns", "If non-zero, when a directory server we contact "
+ "supports it, we will build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted "
+ "connection via its ORPort." },
{ "User", "On startup, setuid to this user" },
/* ==== client options */
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c 2007-01-03 23:58:03 UTC (rev 9259)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection_edge.c 2007-01-04 04:35:18 UTC (rev 9260)
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@
/** Define a schedule for how long to wait between retrying
* application connections. Rather than waiting a fixed amount of
* time between each retry, we wait 10 seconds each for the first
- * two tries, and 15 seconds for each retry after
+ * two tries, and 15 seconds for each retry after
* that. Hopefully this will improve the expected user experience. */
static int
compute_socks_timeout(edge_connection_t *conn)
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/dirserv.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/dirserv.c 2007-01-03 23:58:03 UTC (rev 9259)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/dirserv.c 2007-01-04 04:35:18 UTC (rev 9260)
@@ -1364,6 +1364,10 @@
* counting exit bandwidth. */
/* Also, we might want to document the one-third behavior in
* dir-spec.txt. */
+/* ChangeLog line when we reenable it:
+ - Authorities do not recommend exits as guards if this would shift
+ excess load to the exit nodes.
+*/
smartlist_add(bandwidths, bw);
}
});
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