[or-cvs] r9378: Detect pointer loops in DNS requests and replies; avoid infi (in tor/trunk: . src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Sun Jan 21 17:05:15 UTC 2007
Author: nickm
Date: 2007-01-21 12:05:10 -0500 (Sun, 21 Jan 2007)
New Revision: 9378
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/src/or/eventdns.c
Log:
r9692 at catbus: nickm | 2007-01-21 12:04:22 -0500
Detect pointer loops in DNS requests and replies; avoid infinite loop on such malformed replies. Fixes bug 380.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r9692] on 8246c3cf-6607-4228-993b-4d95d33730f1
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-01-21 06:24:05 UTC (rev 9377)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2007-01-21 17:05:10 UTC (rev 9378)
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
- If our system clock jumps back in time, don't publish a negative
uptime in the descriptor. Also, don't let the global rate limiting
buckets go absurdly negative.
+ - Detect and reject malformed DNS responses containing circular
+ pointer loops.
o Minor bugfixes:
- When computing clock skew from directory HTTP headers, consider what
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/eventdns.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/eventdns.c 2007-01-21 06:24:05 UTC (rev 9377)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/eventdns.c 2007-01-21 17:05:10 UTC (rev 9378)
@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@
name_parse(u8 *packet, int length, int *idx, char *name_out, int name_out_len) {
int name_end = -1;
int j = *idx;
+ int ptr_count = 0;
#define GET32(x) do { if (j + 4 > length) goto err; memcpy(&_t32, packet + j, 4); j += 4; x = ntohl(_t32); } while(0);
#define GET16(x) do { if (j + 2 > length) goto err; memcpy(&_t, packet + j, 2); j += 2; x = ntohs(_t); } while(0);
#define GET8(x) do { if (j >= length) goto err; x = packet[j++]; } while(0);
@@ -759,7 +760,11 @@
GET8(ptr_low);
if (name_end < 0) name_end = j;
j = (((int)label_len & 0x3f) << 8) + ptr_low;
+ /* Make sure that the target offset is in-bounds. */
if (j < 0 || j >= length) return -1;
+ /* If we've jumped more times than there are characters in the
+ * message, we must have a loop. */
+ if (++ptr_count > length) return -1;
continue;
}
if (label_len > 63) return -1;
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