[or-cvs] r9121: if we rotate our onion key, publish a new descriptor, and di (in tor/trunk: doc src/or)

[arma at seul.org]

Author: arma
Date: 2006-12-15 02:58:31 -0500 (Fri, 15 Dec 2006)
New Revision: 9121

Modified:
   tor/trunk/doc/dir-spec.txt
   tor/trunk/src/or/router.c
Log:
if we rotate our onion key, publish a new descriptor, and
die soon after, we want to stick with that onion key when
we restart.


Modified: tor/trunk/doc/dir-spec.txt
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/dir-spec.txt	2006-12-15 07:04:37 UTC (rev 9120)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/dir-spec.txt	2006-12-15 07:58:31 UTC (rev 9121)
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
     "onion-key" NL a public key in PEM format
 
        This key is used to encrypt EXTEND cells for this OR.  The key MUST be
-       accepted for at least XXXX hours after any new key is published in a
+       accepted for at least 1 week after any new key is published in a
        subsequent descriptor.
 
     "signing-key" NL a public key in PEM format
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
     "eventdns" bool NL
 
         Declare whether this version of Tor is using the newer enhanced
-        dns logic.  Versions of Tor without eventdns SHOULD not be used for
+        dns logic.  Versions of Tor without eventdns SHOULD NOT be used for
         reverse hostname lookups.
 
         [All versions of Tor before 0.1.2.2-alpha should be assumed to have
@@ -431,8 +431,7 @@
    blacklisted, and elect not to include them in their network-status lists.
 
    Thus, the network-status list includes all non-blacklisted,
-   non-expired, non-superseded descriptors for ORs that the directory has
-   observed at least once to be running.
+   non-expired, non-superseded descriptors.
 
 4. Directory server operation
 
@@ -506,8 +505,8 @@
    router. Servers must not discard any descriptor listed by any current
    network-status document from any authority.  If there is enough space to
    store additional descriptors, servers SHOULD try to hold those which
-   clients are likely download the most.  (Currently, this is judged based on
-   the interval for which each descriptor seemed newest.)
+   clients are likely to download the most.  (Currently, this is judged
+   based on the interval for which each descriptor seemed newest.)
 
    Authorities SHOULD NOT download descriptors for routers that they would
    immediately reject for reasons listed in 3.1.

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/router.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/router.c	2006-12-15 07:04:37 UTC (rev 9120)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/router.c	2006-12-15 07:58:31 UTC (rev 9121)
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
   state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
   tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
   mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
-  or_state_mark_dirty(state, now+600);
+  or_state_mark_dirty(state, 0);
   return;
  error:
   log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");