[or-cvs] Efficiency hack: call tor_fix_source_file late, not early. ...
Nick Mathewson
nickm at seul.org
Tue Oct 25 07:05:06 UTC 2005
Update of /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv20694/src/or
Modified Files:
circuitlist.c config.c connection_or.c or.h routerparse.c
Log Message:
Efficiency hack: call tor_fix_source_file late, not early. Add "BUG" domain. Domains are now bitmasks... just in case. Make some err msgs non-general.
Index: circuitlist.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/circuitlist.c,v
retrieving revision 1.64
retrieving revision 1.65
diff -u -d -r1.64 -r1.65
--- circuitlist.c 24 Oct 2005 19:37:45 -0000 1.64
+++ circuitlist.c 25 Oct 2005 07:05:03 -0000 1.65
@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@
/* tor_assert(cp->dh_handshake_state); */
break;
default:
- err("Unexpected state %d",cp->state);
+ log_fn(LOG_ERR, LD_BUG, "Unexpected state %d", cp->state);
tor_assert(0);
}
tor_assert(cp->package_window >= 0);
Index: config.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/config.c,v
retrieving revision 1.440
retrieving revision 1.441
diff -u -d -r1.440 -r1.441
--- config.c 17 Oct 2005 23:00:08 -0000 1.440
+++ config.c 25 Oct 2005 07:05:03 -0000 1.441
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
* \brief Code to parse and interpret configuration files.
**/
+#define NEW_LOG_INTERFACE
#include "or.h"
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
#include <shlobj.h>
@@ -389,7 +390,8 @@
return -1;
}
if (options_act(old_options) < 0) { /* acting on the options failed. die. */
[...1238 lines suppressed...]
- log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Initialized state");
+ info(LD_GENERAL, "Initialized state");
or_state_set(new_state);
new_state = NULL;
if (!contents) {
@@ -3466,12 +3424,12 @@
tor_free(state);
fname = get_or_state_fname();
if (write_str_to_file(fname, contents, 0)<0) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Unable to write state to file \"%s\"", fname);
+ warn(LD_FS, "Unable to write state to file \"%s\"", fname);
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(contents);
return -1;
}
- log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Saved state to \"%s\"", fname);
+ info(LD_GENERAL, "Saved state to \"%s\"", fname);
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(contents);
Index: connection_or.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/connection_or.c,v
retrieving revision 1.193
retrieving revision 1.194
diff -u -d -r1.193 -r1.194
--- connection_or.c 17 Oct 2005 16:21:41 -0000 1.193
+++ connection_or.c 25 Oct 2005 07:05:03 -0000 1.194
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
* cells on the network.
**/
+#define NEW_LOG_INTERFACE
#include "or.h"
/** How much clock skew do we tolerate when checking certificates for
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@
int
connection_or_reached_eof(connection_t *conn)
{
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
+ info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return 0;
}
@@ -71,27 +72,27 @@
&headers, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE,
NULL, NULL, 10000, 0)) {
case -1: /* overflow */
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Your https proxy sent back an oversized response. Closing.");
+ warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Your https proxy sent back an oversized response. Closing.");
return -1;
case 0:
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"https proxy response not all here yet. Waiting.");
+ info(LD_OR,"https proxy response not all here yet. Waiting.");
return 0;
/* case 1, fall through */
}
if (parse_http_response(headers, &status_code, &date_header,
&compression, &reason) < 0) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Unparseable headers (connecting to '%s'). Closing.",
- conn->address);
+ warn(LD_OR,"Unparseable headers from proxy (connecting to '%s'). Closing.",
+ conn->address);
tor_free(headers);
return -1;
}
if (!reason) reason = tor_strdup("[no reason given]");
if (status_code == 200) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,
- "HTTPS connect to '%s' successful! (200 \"%s\") Starting TLS.",
- conn->address, reason);
+ info(LD_OR,
+ "HTTPS connect to '%s' successful! (200 \"%s\") Starting TLS.",
+ conn->address, reason);
tor_free(reason);
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) {
/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
@@ -102,8 +103,9 @@
return 0;
}
/* else, bad news on the status code */
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"The https proxy sent back an unexpected status code %d (\"%s\"). Closing.",
- status_code, reason);
+ warn(LD_OR,
+ "The https proxy sent back an unexpected status code %d (\"%s\"). Closing.",
+ status_code, reason);
tor_free(reason);
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
@@ -148,7 +150,7 @@
switch (conn->state) {
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_FLUSHING:
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"finished sending CONNECT to proxy.");
+ debug(LD_OR,"finished sending CONNECT to proxy.");
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_READING;
connection_stop_writing(conn);
break;
@@ -156,7 +158,7 @@
connection_stop_writing(conn);
break;
default:
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"BUG: called in unexpected state %d.", conn->state);
+ err(LD_BUG,"BUG: called in unexpected state %d.", conn->state);
tor_fragile_assert();
return -1;
}
@@ -172,7 +174,7 @@
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
+ debug(LD_OR,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
conn->address,conn->port);
if (get_options()->HttpsProxy) {
@@ -188,7 +190,7 @@
if (authenticator) {
base64_authenticator = alloc_http_authenticator(authenticator);
if (!base64_authenticator)
- log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Encoding https authenticator failed");
+ warn(LD_OR, "Encoding https authenticator failed");
}
if (base64_authenticator) {
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1\r\n"
@@ -326,7 +328,7 @@
if (server_mode(options) && (me=router_get_my_routerinfo()) &&
!memcmp(me->identity_digest, id_digest,DIGEST_LEN)) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
+ info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
return NULL;
}
@@ -380,11 +382,11 @@
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_HANDSHAKING;
conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->s, receiving, 0);
if (!conn->tls) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
+ warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
return -1;
}
connection_start_reading(conn);
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting the handshake");
+ debug(LD_OR,"starting TLS handshake on fd %d", conn->s);
if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0) {
return -1;
}
@@ -403,16 +405,16 @@
switch (tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) {
case TOR_TLS_ERROR:
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"tls error. breaking.");
+ info(LD_OR,"tls error. breaking connection.");
return -1;
case TOR_TLS_DONE:
return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
connection_start_writing(conn);
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"wanted write");
+ debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
return 0;
case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"wanted read");
+ debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
return 0;
}
return 0;
@@ -467,26 +469,26 @@
check_no_tls_errors();
if (! tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls)) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Peer didn't send a cert! Closing.");
+ info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Peer didn't send a cert! Closing.");
return -1;
}
check_no_tls_errors();
if (tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(conn->tls, nickname, sizeof(nickname))) {
- log_fn(severity,"Other side (%s:%d) has a cert without a valid nickname. Closing.",
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"Other side (%s:%d) has a cert without a valid nickname. Closing.",
conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
check_no_tls_errors();
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be router '%s'",
+ debug(LD_OR, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be router '%s'",
conn->address, conn->port, nickname);
if (tor_tls_verify(severity, conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
- log_fn(severity,"Other side, which claims to be router '%s' (%s:%d), has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
+ log_fn(severity,LD_OR,"Other side, which claims to be router '%s' (%s:%d), has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
check_no_tls_errors();
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"The router's cert is valid.");
+ debug(LD_OR,"The router's cert is valid.");
crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) {
@@ -500,7 +502,7 @@
if (router && /* we know this nickname */
router->is_named && /* make sure it's the right guy */
memcmp(digest_rcvd, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
- log_fn(severity,
+ log_fn(severity, LD_OR,
"Identity key not as expected for router claiming to be '%s' (%s:%d)",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
@@ -514,7 +516,7 @@
char expected[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN);
base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- log_fn(severity,
+ log_fn(severity, LD_OR,
"Identity key not as expected for router at %s:%d: wanted %s but got %s",
conn->address, conn->port, expected, seen);
helper_node_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0);
@@ -552,14 +554,14 @@
{
char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
+ debug(LD_OR,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
if (connection_or_check_valid_handshake(conn, digest_rcvd) < 0)
return -1;
if (!connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn)) {
connection_t *c;
if ((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router '%s' is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.",
+ debug(LD_OR,"Router '%s' is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.",
c->nickname, c->s, conn->s);
return -1;
}
@@ -613,7 +615,7 @@
if (connection_handle_write(conn) < 0) {
if (!conn->marked_for_close) {
/* this connection is broken. remove it. */
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bug: unhandled error on write for OR conn (fd %d); removing",
+ warn(LD_BUG,"Bug: unhandled error on write for OR conn (fd %d); removing",
conn->s);
tor_fragile_assert();
conn->has_sent_end = 1; /* otherwise we cry wolf about duplicate close */
@@ -643,7 +645,7 @@
cell_t cell;
loop:
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).",
+ debug(LD_OR,"%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).",
conn->s,(int)buf_datalen(conn->inbuf),tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
if (buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* entire response available? */
return 0; /* not yet */
Index: or.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/or.h,v
retrieving revision 1.724
retrieving revision 1.725
diff -u -d -r1.724 -r1.725
--- or.h 24 Oct 2005 19:37:45 -0000 1.724
+++ or.h 25 Oct 2005 07:05:03 -0000 1.725
@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@
/********************************* circuitbuild.c **********************/
char *circuit_list_path(circuit_t *circ, int verbose);
-void circuit_log_path(int severity, int domain, circuit_t *circ);
+void circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain, circuit_t *circ);
void circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circuit_t *circ);
void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity);
circuit_t *circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int need_uptime,
@@ -1721,7 +1721,7 @@
int control_event_stream_status(connection_t *conn, stream_status_event_t e);
int control_event_or_conn_status(connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t e);
int control_event_bandwidth_used(uint32_t n_read, uint32_t n_written);
-void control_event_logmsg(int severity, int domain, const char *msg);
+void control_event_logmsg(int severity, unsigned int domain, const char *msg);
int control_event_descriptors_changed(smartlist_t *routers);
int control_event_address_mapped(const char *from, const char *to,time_t expires);
Index: routerparse.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/routerparse.c,v
retrieving revision 1.155
retrieving revision 1.156
diff -u -d -r1.155 -r1.156
--- routerparse.c 24 Oct 2005 19:39:45 -0000 1.155
+++ routerparse.c 25 Oct 2005 07:05:03 -0000 1.156
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@
myversion, versionlist);
if (tor_version_parse(myversion, &mine)) {
- err("I couldn't parse my own version (%s)", myversion);
+ err(LD_BUG,"I couldn't parse my own version (%s)", myversion);
tor_assert(0);
}
version_sl = smartlist_create();
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