[or-cvs] some minor cleanups before i move a bnuch of sections

[Roger Dingledine]

Update of /home2/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/design-paper
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/onion/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper

Modified Files:
	challenges.tex 
Log Message:
some minor cleanups before i move a bnuch of sections


Index: challenges.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home2/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.51
retrieving revision 1.52
diff -u -d -r1.51 -r1.52
--- challenges.tex	8 Feb 2005 06:54:47 -0000	1.51
+++ challenges.tex	8 Feb 2005 07:37:30 -0000	1.52
@@ -423,8 +423,7 @@
 % this para should probably move to the scalability / directory system. -RD
 % Nope. Cut for space, except for small comment added above -PFS
 
-\section{Crossroads: Policy issues}
-\label{sec:crossroads-policy}
+\section{Policy issues}
 
 Many of the issues the Tor project needs to address extend beyond
 system design and technology development. In particular, the
@@ -802,8 +801,7 @@
 
 %[XXX Mention correct DNS-RBL implementation. -NM]
 
-\section{Crossroads: Design choices}
-\label{sec:crossroads-design}
+\section{Design choices}
 
 In addition to social issues, Tor also faces some design challenges that must
 be addressed as the network develops.
@@ -969,15 +967,15 @@
 \label{subsec:helper-nodes}
 
 It has been thought for some time that the best anonymity protection
-comes from running your own node~\cite{or-pet00,tor-design}.
-(In fact, in Onion Routing's first design, this was the only option
-possible~\cite{or-ih96}.)  While the first implementation
+comes from running your own node~\cite{tor-design,or-pet00}.
+(In fact, this was the only option in the earliest Onion Routing
+design~\cite{or-ih96}.)  While the first implementation
 had a fixed path length of five nodes, first generation
-Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen 
+Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen
 to simultaneously maximize efficiency and unpredictability in routes.
 If one followed Tor's three node default
 path length, an enclave-to-enclave communication (in which the entry and
-exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves) 
+exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves)
 would be completely compromised by the
 middle node. Thus for enclave-to-enclave communication, four is the fewest
 number of nodes that preserves the $\frac{c^2}{n^2}$ degree of protection
@@ -1188,8 +1186,7 @@
 %RIAA; less so if threat is to application data or individuals or...
 
 \section{Scaling}
-%\label{sec:crossroads-scaling}
-%P2P + anonymity issues:
+\label{sec:scaling}
 
 Tor is running today with hundreds of nodes and tens of thousands of
 users, but it will certainly not scale to millions.
@@ -1486,16 +1483,16 @@
 an unexpected boon from the fact that we're a general-purpose overlay
 network: as Tor grows more popular, other groups who need an overlay
 network on the Internet are starting to adapt Tor to their needs.
-
+%
 Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy online.
 To keep identifying information out of application traffic, we must build
 more and better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people.
-
+%
 Third, we need to gain a reputation for social good, and learn how to
 coexist with the variety of Internet services and their established
 authentication mechanisms. We can't just keep escalating the blacklist
 standoff forever.
-
+%
 Fourth, as described in Section~\ref{sec:scaling}, the current Tor
 architecture does not scale even to handle current user demand. We must
 find designs and incentives to let clients relay traffic too, without