[tor-bugs] #33009 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws bandwidth scans should require a minimum exit bandwidth
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Mon Feb 10 07:41:21 UTC 2020
#33009: sbws bandwidth scans should require a minimum exit bandwidth
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Reporter: teor | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: sbws:
| 1.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/sbws | Version: sbws:
| 1.1.0
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: sbws-majority-blocker, easy, intro, | Actual Points:
sbws-roadmap |
Parent ID: #33121 | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by teor):
Replying to [comment:5 juga]:
> i've not checked which consensus weight corresponds to 600Kbyte/sec
advertised bandwidth.
> i'm not sure what teor meant with "top 75% of exits", ie. which
bandwidth value they think about there.
> Looking https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#toprelays, showing 100
relays per page, it says "Top Relays by Consensus Weight", the bandwidth
column says "Advertised bandwidth", the first relay in the 3rd page (~1/3
~= 75%) shows 58.1 MiB/s.
> We should look which is the actual consensus bandwidth of that 1st
relay, if we want to use a hardcoded minimum value.
> Instead of that i'd suggest, since bandwidth values changes and we
choose exits based on consensus weight, is that:
> 1. create a method in relaylist that order them by consensus weight.
> You could based it `RelayList.exits`, then order them
`sorted(self.relays, key=lambda r: r.consensus_bandwidth)`
> 2. calculate which would be the relay that corresponds to the 75% in
that order
> 3. use that value as the minimum value
Yes, I meant a calculated value.
Ideally, we should calculate the value each time we get a new consensus.
If we recalculate it for every circuit, it might slow down sbws circuit
building.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33009#comment:6>
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