[tor-bugs] #24841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Your relay has a very large number of connections to other relays. Is your outbound address the same as your relay address?

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#24841: Your relay has a very large number of connections to other relays. Is your
outbound address the same as your relay address?
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  tyng                                 |          Owner:  nickm
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:  Tor:
                                                 |  0.3.2.8-rc
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-triage-20180320,                 |  Actual Points:
  033-removed-20180320, 035-deferred-20190115,   |
  041-proposed                                   |
Parent ID:  #33048                               |         Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
                                                 |  Sponsor55-can
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.4.x-final


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 timkuijsten]:
 > > Since I've been starting a couple of new relays as a new relay
 operator, this message occurs now and then in the first couple of days and
 it made me wonder[0]. If we should ignore these numbers as long as they
 are below 60, then why show the message before having connected to at
 least 60 relays? I would propose to crank MIN_RELAY_CONNECTIONS_TO_WARN
 from 5 to 60 (but I'm completely new :)).
 > >
 > > [0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2018-August/016037.html
 >
 > Thanks for this patch!
 >
 > I think this is a good fix, but we could make it better by:
 > * counting the number of relays in the consensus, and using 1% of that
 as a minimum
 > * if the limit is less than 5, use 5 as the minimum
 > * if there is no consensus, use 5 relays as the minimum
 >
 > You can find the number of relays in the consensus by doing something
 like:
 > {{{
 > const networkstatus_t *consensus =
 networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(now, usable_flavour());
 > int n_relays = consensus ? smatlist_len(consensus->routerstatus_list) :
 0;
 > }}}
 >

 nickm, would you like to update the attached patch?

 I think my patch in #33817 will fix one possible source of this issue. But
 we won't see the impact until 0.4.4 or later are deployed to most of the
 network. (And there may be other causes.)

 So it's a good time to adjust the thresholds for this warning.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/24841#comment:20>
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