[tor-bugs] #31730 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Thu Oct 17 02:31:51 UTC 2019
#31730: Revert aarch64 fixup for ESR 60-based bundles with Tor Browser 9
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: gk | Owner: tbb-
| team
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_revision
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, | Actual Points:
TorBrowserTeam201910R tbb-9.0-must |
Parent ID: | Points: 0.5
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Changes (by sysrqb):
* keywords: tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201910R, tbb-9.0-must =>
tbb-mobile, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam201910R tbb-9.0-must
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
If I was smart, I would've saved the current prefs somehow before we
overwrote them, but I didn't think about that. Unfortunately, I'm worried
about changing these. On the one hand, custom prefs aren't recommended but
they are allowed. If we change this without notifying the user then we
could be putting them at risk. We should probably include a warning about
this in the release announcement, at a minimum.
I think we should set `kCustomPref` as `false` if all the prefs are set as
level 4. What do you think? Can you add a function
`isSecurityLevel(index)` that takes an index and iterates through
`kSecuritySettings`, returns true if they match the expected value and
false otherwise? Or something like this?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31730#comment:5>
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