[tor-bugs] #30649 [Core Tor/Tor]: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for unknown machine.
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Tue May 28 18:12:27 UTC 2019
#30649: Every few hours, relays [warn] Received circuit padding stop command for
unknown machine.
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: teor | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.4.1.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor:
| 0.4.1.1-alpha
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-relay, circuitpadding, wtf-pad, | Actual Points:
041-must |
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
| Sponsor2
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Comment (by mikeperry):
This is interesting. The actual log is due refactoring eliminating a
return value propogation/check of
free_circ_machine_infos_with_machinenum() in
circpad_handle_padding_negotiate(). As a result of the check being
removed, the logline is *always* printing even if the machine is valid and
did exist. So adding the check back in will eliminate most of those.
It's not happening that often because normally client-side does not send
STOP commands. The client will only send a STOP of the machine conditions
cease applying. This can happen in the event of a circuit build timeout
(and associated purpose change to MEASUREMENT), though.
So I think all we have to do is make
free_circ_machine_infos_with_machinenum() return a success/fail result,
and check it properly in circpad_handle_padding_negotiate(), before
warning.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30649#comment:1>
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