[tor-bugs] #30531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported
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Sat May 18 12:52:43 UTC 2019
#30531: WebGL antialiasing support enabled iff. OpenGL is supported
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Reporter: intrigeri | Owner: tbb-team
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords: AffectsTails
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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With Tor Browser 8.5-build2, we see 2 different WebGL fingerprints on
panopticlick: 2ef68bcd75e09a41aea04bae556f3ecc on bare metal and in VMs
that support OpenGL acceleration, f9a0f737691a9b57f5294121fc58a2df in VMs
that don't support OpenGL acceleration.
Quoting segfault (from
https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/16337#note-61) who investigated
this further:
"I looked at the JS code used by panopticlick to calculate this hash, and
printed the values which go into the hash. The only difference I could
find is that antialiasing is enabled iff OpenGL is enabled. (That's
exposed via the antialias bool of gl.getContextAttributes(), see
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
US/docs/Web/API/WebGLRenderingContext/getContextAttributes)."
Impact: 1 bit of fingerprinting; risk: nowadays I would assume the huge
majority of bare metal systems that can run TB have OpenGL, but most VMs
haven't (unless geeky configuration is done, which is a minority). So it's
roughly equivalent to splitting the anonymity set between VMs and bare
metal, I'd say.
GeKo says:
> i guess we could think about making the antialiasing info uniform
> like, just saying "no"
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30531>
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