[tor-bugs] #30420 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we recommend that relay operators turn on tcp bbr?
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue May 7 02:51:10 UTC 2019
#30420: Should we recommend that relay operators turn on tcp bbr?
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Reporter: arma | Owner: (none)
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords: network-health, performance
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: | Reviewer:
Sponsor: |
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The internet seems to have a growing number of howto's for switching your
kernel to use the "bbr" congestion control mode of tcp:
https://github.com/google/bbr
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCP_congestion_control#TCP_BBR
Thought 1: doing an experiment where various fractions of Tor relays
switch to this congestion control mode would be neat. Maybe it's the sort
of thing that Shadow could help with, since switching the real Tor network
is both cumbersome and dangerous.
(Though, since Shadow builds its own tcp implementation, it would need to
have an implementation of the bbr variation in order to do a test with it.
And it would need to have realistic *non* Tor background flows to test the
comparison. What a great use case for driving forward Shadow innovation to
be able to capture this test. Cc'ing Rob.)
Thought 2: If God wanted us to be using tcp bbr, we'd be using it by
default already. And we're not, so we should learn why that is. For
example, the wikipedia page indicates that it's not good at fairness in
some situations -- and since Tor relays are often guests on their network,
we might not want to give people more reasons to get angry at them.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30420>
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