[tor-bugs] #29887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Potential user activity data leak

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29887: Potential user activity data leak
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 Reporter:  pf.team                   |          Owner:  tbb-team
     Type:  defect                    |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium                    |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                    |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak             |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:                            |         Points:
 Reviewer:                            |        Sponsor:
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Comment (by pf.team):

 @cypherpunks
 Yes, bookmarkbackups would also be one of these things than need cleaning
 up. Thanks for the info, we haven't gotten around to them yet.

 You are technically right about file creation/modification ts'es, however,
 there is more to consider in this case:

 1) File timestamps are circumstantial evidence for something that is
 itself circumstantial evidence, and gathering it requires slightly higher
 qualifications from adversaries. After all, file timestamps may change for
 a whole number of reasons, whereas with prefs.js they have all this data
 conveniently in one place and labeled.

 2) Obviously, there is no such thing as 100% safety, anonymity or
 security, but at the same time, the adversary is also not some flawless
 leviathan with 100% clarity and competence. For example, employees of
 repressive institutions in authoritarian countries often lack both the
 tech know-how required to conduct a more thorough investigation, and the
 motivation to do so. Every extra step they have to take increases the
 probability that they might give up here and look elsewhere.

 3)

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29887#comment:4>
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