[tor-bugs] #30920 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
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Tue Jul 23 20:06:33 UTC 2019
#30920: Detect uint64 overflow in config_parse_units()
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Reporter: nickm | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Low | Milestone: Tor: 0.4.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Minor | Resolution:
Keywords: easy overflow | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by guigom):
Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
Hi teor, #30864 has been merged and I have a couple of questions.
Nick added a couple of commented out tests in which it is expected for
config_parse_memunit (and thus config_parse_units) to return 0 instead of
UINT64_MAX when detecting 64-bit overflow.
{{{
// tt_u64_op(config_parse_memunit("20000000 TB", &ok), OP_EQ, 0);
// tt_assert(!ok);
}}}
Is this the expected behavior, or should it fallback to UINT64_MAX?
----
In case of using the nowrap mul function inside
unitparse.c:config_parse_units
`make check-includes` tells that it is forbidden to include muldiv.h
inside unitparse.c
Should `lib/intmath/*.h` be appended to confmgt .may_include?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30920#comment:8>
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