[tor-bugs] #28917 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
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Fri Jul 5 18:07:35 UTC 2019
#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
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Reporter: dcf | Owner: cohosh
Type: enhancement | Status: assigned
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Circumvention/Snowflake | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #27385 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by dcf):
Replying to [comment:2 cohosh]:
> We refactored the proxy implementation in the process of adding a
webextension (#23888, #30934). A part of this refactor was to not rely on
the use of cookies for the webextension. We can probably just apply that
refactor here,
The original idea behind the badge (and why it's called a "badge") was
that would be an unobtrusive iframe posted on various web pages that you
would just activate incidentally while browsing. In that model, I don't
see how you can dispense with a cookie. You would have to click and
reactivate something on every page the badge might be on.
But I'm also fully prepared to believe that the many-sites "badge" model,
while it may have made sense for the opt-out flash proxy, doesn't make
sense for the opt-in Snowflake. The number of third-party sites hosting
the Snowflake badge is approximately zero, and if you intersect that with
the number of users who have (1) opted in and (2) are currently
incidentally browsing one of those sites, the number is not even
approximately zero. Therefore I don't think there's a problem with hosting
a single web page with a toggle (and removing the iframe instructions),
and instructing people to visit the page and click the toggle. Just
pointing out that it's a change from how the system has been assumed to
work until now.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28917#comment:3>
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