[tor-bugs] #30716 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Dec 12 17:53:30 UTC 2019
#30716: Improve the obfs4 obfuscation protocol
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: phw | Owner: phw
Type: task | Status:
| needs_review
Priority: High | Milestone:
Component: Circumvention/Obfs4 | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: sponsor28, anti-censorship-roadmap- | Actual Points:
october |
Parent ID: | Points: 20
Reviewer: cohosh | Sponsor:
| Sponsor28-must
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by cohosh):
This looks great so far. I like the usage of a `net.Conn` to compose
sharknado with obfs4. I left a few minor comments but no suggested changes
at the moment. I do have some questions about the implementation:
- The commit message says
{{{
For example, sharknado can -- in
theory -- turn the following packet sequence:
client -- 1500 bytes -> server
client -- 1500 bytes -> server
client -- 500 bytes -> server
into the following sequences:
client -- 1500 bytes -> server
client <- 1500 bytes -- server
client -- 1500 bytes -> server
client -- 500 bytes -> server
}}}
but it looks like it's the client is the one breaking the bursts with
dummy traffic. Should this instead read
{{{
For example, sharknado can -- in
theory -- turn the following packet sequence:
client <- 1500 bytes -- server
client <- 1500 bytes -- server
client <- 500 bytes -- server
into the following sequences:
client <- 1500 bytes -- server
client -- 1500 bytes -- server
client <- 1500 bytes -- server
client <- 500 bytes -- server
}}}
Do we want this to happen only at one side of the connection? Or
eventually for both the client and the server to send dummy traffic? I
took your comment on deployment speed to mean that we're mostly interested
in having the client do the shaping.
- How do servers distinguish between dummy and non-dummy traffic?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30716#comment:20>
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