[tor-bugs] #32021 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Handle rendezvous client circuit build expire properly
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Wed Dec 4 15:47:38 UTC 2019
#32021: hs-v3: Handle rendezvous client circuit build expire properly
---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------
Reporter: dgoulet | Owner: dgoulet
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| 0.4.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs, tor-client, tor-circuit | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #30200 | Points: 0.4
Reviewer: asn | Sponsor:
| Sponsor27-must
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Comment (by asn):
Replying to [comment:5 dgoulet]:
> Replying to [comment:3 asn]:
> > Hmm, logic seems sound.
> >
> > Just a suggestion: While we are at it, should we make a new function
to host the body of `if
(!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) {`? We can put it in
the HS subsystem so that the logic is contained in there.
>
> Do you mean add something like `hs_circ_has_timed_out()` type of
function and return true or false for a circuit?
Yeah something like that. Perhaps we can call it
`hs_circ_should_be_flagged_as_timed_out()` given the semantics of the
function.
What do you think?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32021#comment:6>
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