[tor-bugs] #31223 [Core Tor/Tor]: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
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Tue Dec 3 17:30:59 UTC 2019
#31223: Research approaches for improving the availability of services under DoS
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Reporter: asn | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs tor-dos | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 15
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor27-can
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Comment (by asn):
Just to expand on the `Introducing application-layer anonymous tokens that
allow legit clients to get priority over DoS attacker` from the top post.
This would be introducing some sort of anonymous credentials system for
onion services, where onions can give some tokens to their good clients in
an out-of-band fashion and these tokens are used during the introduction
protocol to prioritize them over the swarm of unknown clients.
With regards to primitives that can be used for such anonymous tokens
there is a whole literature on anonymous credentials that we should look
into. Here are some more links that have been sent to me and I have noted
them for future reading: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/877.pdf
https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-
schnorr.mediawiki#Blind_Signatures
https://github.com/w3f/schnorrkel/blob/master/src/vrf.rs
https://github.com/w3f/schnorrkel/blob/master/src/vrf.rs
Further questions is how these tokens will be passed to legit clients in
the first place, if the onion service is unreachable. And what's the
difference between this approach and the onion service just making more
onion addresses for good clients instead of tokens.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31223#comment:6>
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