[tor-bugs] #31561 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue Dec 3 15:29:35 UTC 2019
#31561: hs-v3: Service can keep unused intro points in its list
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Reporter: dgoulet | Owner: dgoulet
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed
Keywords: tor-hs, hv-v3 | Actual Points: 0.1
Parent ID: #30200 | Points: 0.2
Reviewer: asn, mikeperry | Sponsor: Sponsor27-must
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Changes (by dgoulet):
* status: needs_revision => closed
* resolution: => fixed
Comment:
Ok good news. We don't need new code here. This has been fixed through
#32094 and #32020
Short summary is that:
1. #32020: Added the code to remove a circuit from the HS circuitmap on
close, free and repurpose.
2. #32094: Made it that we only use the HS circuitmap when launching
introduction points so the `launch_intro_point_circuits()` actually
notices now that the IP that timed out has not more circuit and thus a
retry is done up to `MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES = 3`.
Combining both, this means that `cleanup_intro_points()` will remove the
IP after 3 fail retries and thus clean it up properly the service list.
> This is bad because of #31548, this means an intro point can end up in
the descriptor even though the service never established any circuits to
it...
This is not the case now since we use the HS circuitmap to learn if the
circuit is established or not.
We are done here. Resolving as "fixed" even though this ticket resulted in
no actual patches applied to master.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31561#comment:24>
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