[tor-bugs] #30196 [Core Tor/sbws]: Add the tor version to the sbws bandwidth file header
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Apr 17 11:35:00 UTC 2019
#30196: Add the tor version to the sbws bandwidth file header
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Reporter: teor | Owner: (none)
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: sbws: 1.2.x-final
Component: Core Tor/sbws | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by irl):
I had a discussion with juga in IRC, here are some things we discussed:
* The need for the inline contact information becomes evident when we look
at how much trouble we've had tracking down who runs the default bridges
in Tor Browser #30121
* Inline metadata is better than out-of-band metadata because it is
archived by Tor Metrics along with the bandwidth measurement data
* The need for AS as well as country allows us to correlate BGP events
with bandwidth changes. Ideally we can know both the AS of the scanner and
the target. Tor Metrics already knows the AS of the relay.
* In some cases, the target is on a CDN, which means the AS may not be
known in advance. In these cases we might choose to omit the AS number and
instead use a user-assigned country code for the target.
* We could assign QM-QZ (user-assigned codes not used elsewhere in Tor to
my knowledge) to CDN providers but each new provider used would require a
spec change, and external researchers would end up using whatever value
and not being able to interop their data with ours if we clash.
* We could use the OO escape code and build codes like "OOFastly" which is
probably the more maintainable solution, but would require that parsers do
not panic when they see >2 characters (I know the standard is known as
alpha-2 but it isn't actually limited to 2 characters!)
* We could use Tor's geoip database to resolve the IP address resolved via
the same circuit of the CDN into a country/IP address to add to the
measurements, but this may prove to be unreliable especially in the longer
term as IPv4 exhaustion causes more and more IP address swapping about.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30196#comment:3>
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