[tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Nov 7 19:47:02 UTC 2018
#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
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Reporter: starlight | Owner: (none)
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Component: Core Tor/Tor
Version: Tor: 0.3.4.9 | Severity: Normal
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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A relay I operate recently experienced a DOS state resulting from intense
scanning behavior. The scanner initiated huge quantities of connections
outbound on an exit such that the interface maximum configured socket
count (62k) was fully consumed and normal client activity was squashed to
zero. Load was so intense it was difficult to SSH in, NTP complained it
could not reach time servers and numerous attempts were required to
successfully open a daemon control socket (via loopback, not sure why).
Was able to mitigate the attack without restarting any daemons and nothing
broke, node resumed normal operation. Clearly a recoverable resource
exhaustion scenario.
To limit the impact of this category of activity, two relatively simple
mitigations come to mind:
1) create a configurable limit on the number of OR + DIR + exit_edge
connections on each interface which may be set lower than absolute
resource limits; this will prevent a DOS situation from rendering the
overall system inaccessible and hopefully permit unimpaired daemon control
ports creation; the setting will interact with the maximum number of in-
flight DNS queries when a local resolver is configured and this ought to
be documented
2) create a outbound exit_edge connection rate limit set to some
reasonable value to constrain scanning
NOTES:
file handle limit 128k
nf_conntrack_max = 65536
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28367>
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