[tor-bugs] #23136 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: moat integration (fetch bridges for the user)
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Fri Mar 2 11:58:34 UTC 2018
#23136: moat integration (fetch bridges for the user)
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Reporter: mcs | Owner: brade
Type: defect | Status: closed
Priority: Very High | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Launcher | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution: fixed
Keywords: TorBrowserTeam201803R, ux-team | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #24689 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor: Sponsor4
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Changes (by gk):
* status: needs_review => closed
* resolution: => fixed
Comment:
Replying to [comment:74 mcs]:
> I should have mentioned that we have not yet addressed items 1) and 2)
from comment:49. The root cause of both problems is the same: we cannot do
Moat things while tor has a meek client running. As I mentioned in
comment:55, there is no simple solution for that issue.
I don't think 1) and 2) have necessarily the same root causes. I agree
with you that if I am using, say, meek-azure right now and then do request
bridges bad things will happen. Could you open a new ticket for that
scenario? (in case there is none already that covers it).
However, 1) as I tested it is different. As I said me using meek has been
minutes, hours, days etc. ago and I am now surfing without any bridges.
Still, as soon as I want to request bridges from TPO things go wrong. Not
sure where exactly the bug is but meek should not be running anymore as
soon as I am not using it anymore. I wonder if we could tackle that one
while we are at it. Open a new ticket, too? 2) is more like my case 1)
because strictly speaking we are done using meek requesting the bridges
(and should *not* be using it in parallel anymore).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23136#comment:76>
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