[tor-bugs] #22089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Decentraleyes to slighten off a bit Exit traffic and work around some CDNs blocking of Tor

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Jun 30 22:09:22 UTC 2018


#22089: Add Decentraleyes to slighten off a bit Exit traffic and work around some
CDNs blocking of Tor
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  imageverif                           |          Owner:  tbb-
                                                 |  team
     Type:  enhancement                          |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser             |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-          |  Actual Points:
  performance                                    |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > analyze the proposed privacy, security, and performance gains adding
 $extension to Tor Browser, especially compared to the privacy, security,
 etc. means Tor Browser *already* offers. Please, include the downsides of
 adding $extension to the browser as well (our design document might help).

 gk will take some time before adding that into the TB design document so
 I'll go ahead now:

 ---------

 # Compatibility

 The proposed extension is a WebExtension that is compatible with the FF60
 ESR release.

 # Gains

 ## Privacy gains

 There are no crucial privacy gains compared to what the Tor Browser
 already offers.

 ## Security gains

 Since the proposed extension will fetch libraries locally, this helps in
 rare cases in which CDN providers are hacked and used to serve
 malicious/junk/cryptojacking code (see [1] for a recent example that
 doesn't apply in this case, but just to illustrate the point).

 Some CDN endpoints don't support HTTPS[2], and some website operators user
 them. With the proposed extension this problem will be addressed since the
 fetch won't happen and libraries will be served locally.

 ## Performance gains

 Since the proposed extension will fetch libraries locally, this will help
 significantly in time load to fetch said libraries from the known CDN
 endpoints, especially in mobile devices with TBA.

 This performance gain will apply to the Tor network itself, though it will
 be very small and limited.

 ## Usability gains

 Some CDN endpoints block Tor exit nodes, with this extension this problem
 can be solved since the resources will be fetched locally.

 -------

 # Downsides

 ## Usability downsides

 Some redirects by the proposed extension fail when a website assigns the
 "crossorigin" attribute to a script element that references an injectable
 resource. The relevant issue is not fixed on FF60, but has received a
 design approval from Mozilla developers.[3][4] That said the extension has
 a whitelist of such domains to prevent the said issue from occurring in
 the first place,[5] and there are proposed methods to detect sufficiently
 enough of these domains.[6] The developer of the extension further adds:

 The plan is to completely get rid of the list of tainted domains. That
 said, since older versions of Firefox will not magically disappear, and
 vendors of other web browsers might not approve the necessary API changes,
 being able to detect tainted domains will likely stay relevant.[6]

 ## Security downsides

 There are no known security downsides.

 ## Performance downsides

 There are no known performance downsides.

 Moreover, there is no significant memory footprint since only a list of
 dozens of URLs[5][7] is cached, unlike HTTPS Everywhere for instance.

 ## Privacy downsides

 Decentraleyes usage may be detected with JS but that will be harmless if
 everyone already has it, so no privacy concerns to note.

 ----------

 [1] : https://scotthelme.co.uk/protect-site-from-cryptojacking-csp-sri/

 [2] : Such as
 https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/blob/master/core/mappings.js#L268

 [3] : https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/issues/16#note_3620

 [4] : https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1419459

 [5] :
 https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/blob/master/core/interceptor.js#L53

 [6] : https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/issues/294

 [7] :
 https://git.synz.io/Synzvato/decentraleyes/blob/master/core/mappings.js

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22089#comment:18>
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