[tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sun Jun 24 19:01:12 UTC 2018


#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
 Reporter:  asn                                  |          Owner:  dgoulet
     Type:  defect                               |         Status:
                                                 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium                               |      Milestone:  Tor:
                                                 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor                         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal                               |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-          |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis                                      |
Parent ID:                                       |         Points:  1
 Reviewer:                                       |        Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------

Comment (by s7r):

 I don't understand how this could be related. I am obviously running a Tor
 version that includes the DoS protection.

 {{{
 Jun 24 09:50:55.000 [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits
 killed with too many cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0
 connections closed. 0 single hop clients refused.
 }}}

 Do we treat different single hop client is the relay is also an Exit? The
 thing is, I don't see these warnings on my middle relays and bridges,
 while I do run the same Tor version everywhere (alpha-dev).

 Why would Exit relays treat rend circuits any different? Why would clients
 pick Exit relays in the RP position?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:46>
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