[tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)
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Sun Jun 24 19:01:12 UTC 2018
#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Reporter: asn | Owner: dgoulet
Type: defect | Status:
| needs_information
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-hs needs-insight needs- | Actual Points:
diagnosis |
Parent ID: | Points: 1
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
-------------------------------------------------+-------------------------
Comment (by s7r):
I don't understand how this could be related. I am obviously running a Tor
version that includes the DoS protection.
{{{
Jun 24 09:50:55.000 [notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits
killed with too many cells. 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked addresses. 0
connections closed. 0 single hop clients refused.
}}}
Do we treat different single hop client is the relay is also an Exit? The
thing is, I don't see these warnings on my middle relays and bridges,
while I do run the same Tor version everywhere (alpha-dev).
Why would Exit relays treat rend circuits any different? Why would clients
pick Exit relays in the RP position?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15618#comment:46>
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